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China’s economic reforms have resulted in spectacular growth and poverty reduction. However, 
China’s institutions look ill-suited to achieve such a result, and they indeed suffer from serious 
shortcomings. To solve this “China puzzle” this paper analyses China’s institution – a regionally 
decentralized authoritarian system. The central government has control over personnel, whereas 
sub-national governments run the bulk of the economy; and they initiate, negotiate, implement, 
divert and resist reforms, policies, rules and laws. China’s reform trajectories have been shaped 
by regional decentralization. Spectacular performance on the one hand and grave problems on 
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1.  Introduction 
 
 Chinese economic reforms, which have been in flux for three decades, have more than 
doubled China’s economic growth, from an average of 4.4 percent annually before 1978 to an 
average of 9.5 percent after 1978. Even more impressively, the contribution of TFP to the growth 
has increased from 11 percent before 1978 to more than 40 percent afterwards (Perkins and 
Rawski, 2008). This process has transformed the world’s largest developing country from a 
centrally-planned economy into a mixed market economy, while simultaneously reducing 
poverty at a scale unparalleled in world history (World Bank, 2002). During the reform period 
the Chinese per capita GDP increased by almost eight-fold, and China has transformed from one 
of the poorest countries in the world2 into a major economic power. Today’s China is the world’s 
largest producer and largest consumer of many conventional industrial staples and high-tech 
products, such as steel, cars, TV sets, personal computers, cell phones and internet usage, etc. 
(NSB, 2005) and has the world’s largest foreign reserves. The current size of the Chinese 
economy, in terms of GDP, is larger than the sum of 83 countries in Eastern Europe, the CIS and 
all of Africa (the author’s calculation based on Maddison, 2003). This makes a research on China 
more imperative for understanding the world economy. 
 
Table 1. Annual Growth of China’s GDP, Fixed Capital, Labor, and TFP, 1952-2005 
 
Source: Perkins and Rawski, 2008. 
 
However, in sharp contrast to this spectacular performance, it has been reported that from 
the viewpoint of standard wisdom, such as the Washington Consensus or the recent empirical 
literature of cross-country studies, Chinese institutions in government, corporate governance, law 
and finance, look notoriously weak. Moreover, Chinese reform policies are often unconventional 
and sometimes even look diametrically opposed to ‘standard’ policy suggestions (Weitzman and 
                                                        
2 At the outset of the reform, China’s per capita GDP was about the same as that of Zambia, which was lower than 
half of the Asian average or lower than two-thirds of the African average, and its size was about one half of the 
Soviet Union (Maddison, 2003). Moreover, it had almost no trade with other countries. 
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Xu, 1994; Rodrik, 2006).3  
According to conventional wisdom, the government should protect private property rights, 
enforce contracts, and separate itself from business (North, 1981; Acemoglu and Johson, 2005; 
Rodrik, 2006). Yet, the Chinese government is deeply involved in business, and there is no clear 
separation between government and business. Using commonly-applied standards, China is in 
general below-average on most measurements of the application of the rule of law or for 
governance quality (Allen et al., 2005); and is among the most corrupt countries in the world. 4 
Moreover, throughout most of the three-decade reform process there was no constitutional 
protection of private property rights until recently (the 2004 constitutional amendment). To 
summarize, China’s weak institutions are ill-suited to achieve economic development. Thus, the 
Chinese reforms pose great challenges to standard economic theories. Can economic theory 
explain China’s reforms? Is the Chinese reform a miracle? This paper will tackle these 
challenges through a unified conceptual framework which synthesises existing literature.  
 Recently, a growing amount of literature on institutions and reforms demonstrate a 
general consensus among economists and policy makers that a set of institutions must be in place 
to make markets function well. Therefore, a market-oriented reform should focus mainly on 
institution-building to protect property rights. Nevertheless, a vital challenge faced by all 
transition economies and developing economies is how to build these requisite institutions, and 
how to carry out the reforms. A simplistic, yet fairly popular view is that markets will form as 
long as private property is well-protected through proper institutions. However, lessons drawn 
from numerous historical and contemporary cases show that markets and economic development 
do not develop spontaneously; ownership protection is not created independent of market 
development; and private ownership alone is insufficient for the market economy to function 
(Coase, 1992; Smith, 1763, 1776). Without government functioning beyond the protection of 
property rights, markets often do not develop; even worse, disorder can destroy markets as easily 
as dictators. Yet, failures of market-oriented reforms launched by governments are ubiquitous. 
This is a fundamental dilemma faced by any institution-building reform, and echoes Coase’s 
famous question: what is the boundary of the firm? (Coase, 1937). As I argue in this paper, the 
lessons of China’s reforms suggest that an answer to this fundamental question is ultimately 
determined by the tradeoffs between costs and benefits of different forms of the government. The 
trajectory of China’s reforms, reform strategies, outcomes, achievements and problems, are 
mainly determined by China’s political and economic institutions.  
 Following the theoretical literature of institutional analysis (Coase, 1992; Stiglitz, 2002; 
Hurwicz, 2007), in this paper the word ‘institution’ refers to those basic and stable mechanisms 
which govern the incentives of agents and coordinate activities in major political and economic 
games. Thus, ‘institutional foundations’ in this paper refer to those basic and stable mechanisms 
that determine the incentives of the most important players in China’s reform and development.5  
                                                        
3 In comparing Chinese and Indian reforms with Washington Consensus policies, Rodrik (2006) said: “…their 
policies remained highly unconventional. With high levels of trade protection, lack of privatization, extensive 
industrial policies, and lax fiscal and financial policies through the 1990s, these two economies hardly looked like 
exemplars of the Washington Consensus. Indeed, had they been dismal failures instead of the successes they turned 
out to be, they would have arguably presented stronger evidence in support of Washington Consensus policies.” 
4 China has a “Corruption Perception Index” level of 5, which is similar to Indonesia, Iraq, Myanmar, Nigeria, 
Sudan and Somalia etc. (Svensson, 2005). 
5 These mechanisms are endogenous in that they are created through the strategic interactions of agents. Thus, 
institution may also be regarded as the equilibrium of the game in the economic and political world (Greif, 2006). A 
popular definition of institution is given by North (1990) that “institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, 
5 
 
Based on a large body of literature, I argue that China’s fundamental institution that deeply 
affects executives’ incentives and behaviors, which in turn impact society, is what I call the 
regionally decentralized authoritarian (RDA) regime (Section 2). The RDA regime is 
characterized as a combination of political centralization and economic regional decentralization. 
On the one hand, the national government’s control is substantial in that the Chinese political and 
personnel governance structure has been highly centralized. Sub-national government officials 
are appointed from above, and the appointment and promotion of sub-national government 
officials serve as powerful instruments for the national government to induce regional officials to 
follow the central government’s policies. This feature fundamentally distinguishes the Chinese 
RDA regime from federalism, where governors or mayors are elected, and they are supposed to 
represent and be accountable to their constituents. On the other hand, the governance of the 
national economy is delegated to sub-national governments. Regional economies (provinces, 
municipalities, and counties) are relatively self-contained, and sub-national governments have 
overall responsibility for initiating and coordinating reforms, providing public services, and 
making and enforcing laws within their jurisdictions. This feature qualitatively differentiates the 
Chinese economy from a typical centrally-planned economy.  
China’s RDA regime evolved before and during the post-Mao reforms, and some of its 
important features can be traced back to much earlier in China’s history. There are two critical 
historical factors that make China’s RDA regime somewhat unique. First, China is the only 
country in the world that has more than two thousand years of imperial history, which had a 
unique governance structure, and today’s RDA regime inherits some important elements from 
this governance structure. Second, the Cultural Revolution is unique in the history of world 
communist movements. The ensuing destruction of the communist institutions and society led to 
disillusion with the communist ideology and a change of the legitimacy base of the Chinese 
Communist Party, weakened resistance to reforms, and has shaped the basic characteristics of the 
RDA regime, paving the road for the post-Mao reforms.  
In the RDA regime, sub-national governments have influence or even direct control rights 
over a substantial amount of resources, such as land, firms, financial resources, energy, raw 
materials, and others.6 Sub-national governments are major players in the bulk of the Chinese 
economy. Under the supervision of the central government they initiate, negotiate, implement, 
divert and resist reforms, policies, rules and laws. They drive, influence or hamper 
regional/national economic development, macroeconomic conditions, environmental 
conservation or degradation, social stability, etc. China’s reform trajectories have been shaped by 
centrally-controlled regional decentralization. Spectacular performance on the one hand and 
grave problems on the other hand are all created or closely associated with this governance 
structure. 
At the early stages of the reforms, the central government delegated more autonomous 
power and provided stronger incentives to sub-national governments, in order to encourage them 
to try out reforms and promote economic growth. Thus, regional competition has been a major 
component of China’s three decades of reform (Section 3). When a region has a higher growth 
rate than others, the head of the region will enjoy greater power and will be more likely to be 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.” However, this definition is too 
abstract to be operational. 
6 “In effect, it is the sub-national levels of Government that implement China’s national development agenda. Nearly 
70 percent of total public expenditure in China takes place at the sub-national level (i.e. provincial, prefecture, 
county, and township), of which more than 55 percent takes place at sub-provincial levels” (The World Bank, 2002). 
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promoted. One of the most important initiatives taken by many sub-national governments was 
the development of non-state firms, including FDI and indigenous firms (e.g. the township-
village enterprises), which has been the most important engine of China’s economic growth since 
the mid-1980s. 
Chinese sub-national governments not only compete against quantifiable targets, such as 
GDP growth rate; but, they also often compete in initiating or testing new reform policies, i.e. 
regional reform experiments (Section 4). They have been given considerable responsibility for 
regional coordination, and such decentralized coordination has facilitated regional reform 
experiments; since sub-national governments are closer to experimenting sites, they are much 
better-informed about local information than the central government, and therefore can 
coordinate more effectively. Regionally-based coordination makes economy-wide coordination 
failures less likely when there are external shocks. This also makes it easier to experiment with 
institutional changes locally without causing disruption to the rest of the economy. Most 
importantly, by incorporating regional experiments as an essential part of the central decision-
making process, the political risks of advancing reforms are substantially reduced, and political 
opposition to reforms is significantly weakened (Sections 2 and 4). Indeed, almost all successful 
reforms in the past three decades were introduced through local experiments (Section 5).  
Nevertheless, the intrinsic deficiencies of an authoritarian regime, such as the lack of an 
independent judiciary, rent-seeking behaviour, and a failure to respond to citizens’ preferences, 
are important parts of the characteristics of China’s RDA regime, without exception (Section 6). 
Although some of these problems might be mitigated when sub-national governments face fierce 
regional competition, regional competition may lead to other problems, such as regional 
protection. Moreover, many problems inherent in the RDA regime may be worsened when the 
effectiveness of regional competition is weakened, e.g. when sub-national governments face 
multiple tasks, they strategically chose to ignore some tasks in the competition. Also, regional 
competition may lead to ‘races to the bottom’ for some tasks, which can be much worse than 
simply being ignored. China’s future depends on how those problems are resolved, and given 
that they are deficient outcomes of the RDA regime, an ultimate solutions lies in a fundamental 
transformation of the institution itself.  
Although determined by its distinctive history China’s RDA regime is itself unique, there 
are still some general lessons that can be drawn from China’s reforms and development for other 
developing countries. These are discussed in the Concluding section. 
One of the major purposes of this paper is to address the so-called “China Puzzle.” It is 
undisputed among economists that the quality of institutions is important for reform and 
development, because they determine incentives for executives and all the players in an economy. 
China is regarded in cross-country study literature as having poor institutions, such as poor legal 
protection of property rights, poor corporate governance, lack of democratic accountability and 
an absence of the rule of law. The resulting forecast is that Chinese officials will be corrupt, will 
not work hard, and will not collect and report information correctly, all of which are partly 
correct empirically. However, much more importantly, this theory would also suggest that, under 
poor institutions, executives in China would block reforms, therefore preventing economic 
development. Nevertheless, the overall performance of China’s reforms and development 
appears not only magnificent, but unparalleled in world history in its gigantic scale and 
prolonged rapid growth. This incredible contrast between “poor” institutions and China’s 
spectacular performance challenges our general understanding of the mechanics of institutions 
and our understanding of “institutional quality.”  
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First, there appear to be conceptual misunderstandings about what exactly constitutes an 
institution in the literature. The so-called institution is sometimes improperly defined or 
misinterpreted in certain popular empirical or policy studies. One of the most widespread 
approaches is to label a set of narrowly-defined measurements as the perfect “institution” based 
on some observed features of developed market economies, e.g. the US. Then, all other 
countries’ practices are measured against this standard to see the imperfections of those 
countries’ institutions. Although the empirical findings that follow from that approach could be 
useful in a narrow scope, serious problems may arise when this approach is generalized. Without 
a thorough understanding of the working mechanisms of institutions in developed and 
developing economies, such mechanical and narrow interpretations of institution ignore the 
essence of these institutions. This kind of research, to some extent, is not only at odds with the 
theoretical literature on institutions (a la North, 1990; Coase, 1991; Stiglitz, 2002; Hurwitz, 2007 
etc.),7 but also can be misleading in general. For instance, the concept of, and the mechanism by 
which, the rule of law affects economies has been the subject of many debates. However, most of 
the popular empirical cross-country studies apply a narrow definition of the rule of law and 
ignore the debates on the subject, such that the US is often taken as the ideal (or almost ideal) 
model in those studies. Yet, if we look at the widespread financial fraud and the deep corruption 
from the grassroots to the top executives on Wall Street revealed throughout the 2008 financial 
crises and the Enron-WorldCom scandal in 2002 etc., the contrast between this illusion and 
reality is striking. 
Moreover, very often the empirical measurements used in cross-country studies are too 
narrow to capture the functioning of institutions in developing economies, such as in China. As a 
result, all the functioning institutions that are beyond the scope of those narrow definitions are 
ignored, as if they did not exist. Consequently, China’s performance becomes inexplicable, and it 
becomes either an outlier to be ignored or a puzzle in cross-country studies.  
The empirical study of the protection of private property rights and contract enforcement is a 
concrete example. It is true that in China there was no formal or constitutional protection of 
private property until 2004, and commercial codes related to contracts were not enacted until the 
late 1980s, and moreover remained unimportant until the late 1990s. However, there was semi-
formal and informal protection of private property, and contract enforcement mechanisms were 
exercised by some sub-national governments under a special social context in Chinese history or 
by social norms. Yet, these institutions often are unaccounted for in almost all cross country 
studies. Even worse, according to some “standard” policy advice, these more informal 
institutions might be regarded as obstacles that should be replaced by “standard” institutions as 
quickly as possible, even though setting up “standard” institutions may be very difficult, time-
consuming, or even counter-productive under certain political conditions. 
How should a country transform a centrally-planned economy into a market economy? What 
are the most important and effective reforms for economic development? How can a reform 
motivate sub-national governments and at the same time coordinate and control them? These 
subjects have been debated by economists, political scientists, historians, sociologists, and others 
for decades, both in general and in the context of China. Their viewpoints are, however, scattered, 
and very often scholars in different disciplines do not talk to each other. This paper attempts to 
                                                        
7 “The value of including such institutional factors in the corpus of mainstream economics is made clear by recent 
events in Eastern Europe. These ex-communist countries are advised to move to a market economy, and their leaders 
wish to do so, but without the appropriate institutions no market economy of any significance is possible. If we 
knew more about our own economy we would be in a better position to advise them.” (Coase, 1992) 
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develop a coherent conceptual framework which synthesizes a multi-disciplinary discussion on 
China’s institutions, reforms and development. In addition to improving our understanding of 
China’s reforms and economic development, by doing so, I also hope to deepen our general 
understanding of political and economic institutions, and on the evolution of these institutions. 
This paper is not an attempt of an exhaustive literature survey. A full scale of such a survey 
would require multiple volumes. Therefore, many important contributions are not covered due to 
space restrictions and my ignorance on the subject, particularly beyond the field of economics. 
For this reason, for many very serious problems China is facing, I have discussed only some of 
them briefly. For many others I have only mentioned them without elaboration, such as problems 
of election, judiciary, corruption, social security and environment etc.  
 
2. The Fundamental Institution: Regionally Decentralized Authoritarianism   
 
Transformation from a centralized economy to a market economy requires both institutional 
support and institutional change. In addition, developing from an agrarian economy into a 
modern market economy also entails creating better institutions. However, reforms have never 
started from an institutional vacuum. All reforms have to begin with existing institutions, and any 
institutional change has to be initiated and implemented by agents within these existing 
institutions (even in the case of a revolution, existing institutions still have profound long run 
impacts). For all of these reasons, historically-inherited institutions have far-reaching impacts on 
an economy, sometimes long after those institutions have been changed or abandoned (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982; North, 1990). No major distinctive features of an economy – including 
reforms and subsequent changes – can be properly understood without understanding the 
fundamental institutions that underpin the economy; moreover, this is especially true when 
considering China’s spectacular and prolonged growth on the one hand, and its serious socio-
economic problems on the other.  
In this section, I introduce the fundamental institution of China, which I call the regionally 
decentralized authoritarian (RDA) system. 8  The RDA system is characterized by a highly 
centralized political and personnel controls at the national level, and a regionally decentralized 
administrative and economic system. Both decision-making and policy implementations in the 
RDA regime, from national strategic issues to concrete local matters, are deeply influenced by 
this combination of political centralization and economic decentralization. These features 
qualitatively differentiate China’s regime from a federal state, a unitary state, and a totalitarian 
regime.  
 
2.1 Decentralized Economic Governance: Regional Decentralization 
 
A salient feature of the Chinese governance structure is the relatively hands-off approach 
taken by the national government with respect to most of the national economy, while sub-
national governments deeply involved in the economies within their jurisdiction, including 
regional firms.  The Chinese government consists of a region-based multi-level hierarchy. Below 
the central government, there are four levels of sub-national governments: provincial level, 
                                                        
8 The concept of regionally decentralized authoritarianism was coined to characterize China’s institution in 2006 in 
the first draft of this paper. In 2009 I read Landry (2008), where he uses the word decentralized authoritarianism. 
Although looks similar on the surface, the meaning of RDA is substantially different from the words of Landry 
(2008) just like the extensive differences between this paper and his book.  
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municipal level (or prefecture level), county level and township level. The central government 
directly controls only a small proportion of the Chinese economy. The largest economic sector 
that the central government controls directly is industry, and even within this industry the central 
government directly employed  less than 4 % of all the industrial employees nationwide (NSB, 
2006b).  
Most government functions are carried out by sub-national governments. Although by 
constitution China is not a federal state, in many important economic issues Chinese sub-national 
governments are more powerful than their counterparts in federal countries around the world, 
since they are responsible for much broader regional matters than simply fiscal issues. 
Unfortunately, almost all the empirical papers in the literature look at only fiscal decentralization, 
since there is no well-accepted methodology to measure broadly defined regional 
decentralization. In the context of China’s decentralization, although fiscal decentralization is 
sometimes a reasonable proxy for decentralization more generally, other times fiscal 
centralization efforts were compensated by regional decentralization in other dimensions. Thus, 
focusing on fiscal decentralization alone can be misleading (this will be elaborated in later 
sections). 
China’s governance structure does not fit neatly into standard conceptions of authoritarian 
regimes. According to cross-country studies, fiscal decentralization is closely linked with 
democracy. However, China’s authoritarian regime is one of the fiscally most decentralized 
countries in the world. Contrasting China’s fiscal decentralization with its counterparts in the rest 
of the world during the early 2000s, the total expenditure of Chinese sub-national governments 
accounted for about 70% of the national total, which was far larger than that of the world’s 
largest federal countries such as the U.S. (46%), Germany (40%) and Russia (38%) (Wong, 
2006).  
The following Figure 1 depicts the governance structure of the Chinese economy. The 
statistics in the figure reflect the situation in the year 2005, though the structure has been stable 
throughout the reform era.9 This governance structure is the result of a half-century of political 
development (Perkins, 1977, 1988; Wong, 1985; Granick, 1990; Naughton, 1995; Liu et al., 
2006; Wu, 2009); moreover, many important features of it can be traced back to imperial times 
(to be further discussed later). Not long after a full scale transplantation of the Soviet model in 
the early 1950s, there were two major campaigns that lead to vast waves of decentralizations at 
extremely high costs. The first started in the late 1950s (the Great Leap Forward (GLF)), and the 
second in the late 1960s (the Cultural Revolution) (Shirk, 1993; Liu et al., 2006).10  
During the GLF campaign, central ministries handed over most centrally controlled SOEs to 
sub-national governments. As a result, the sub-national governments’ tax revenue increased from 
20% of the national total in 1958 to 76% in 1959 and 79% in 1961, much higher than those in the 
post-Mao reform period (Table 2). Central planning was replaced by regional competition. Sub-
national governments were encouraged to compete with each other to over-fulfill planning 
targets, to establish “communes” earlier or at a larger scale, to close down markets, etc. They 
                                                        
9 The total number of central SOEs listed in Fig.1 is 2128, which is from the NSB. However, according to the 
SASAC (State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission), the number should be less than 170 in 
2005 and 151 in 2007 (http://www.sasac.gov.cn/zyqy/qyml/default.htm). The latter is the total number of parent 
companies controlled directly by the central government, which supervises a large number of subsidiary companies; 
whereas the former is the total number of all establishments managed by the central government.  
10 The GLF established the People’s Commune, thus the Commune-Brigade Enterprises (the predecessor of the 
TVEs); and expanded local industries under state and collective ownership. An essential part of the human cost of 
the GLF is the Great Famine (see Lin, 1990 and Li and Yang, 2005). 
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were also encouraged to try out different commune organizations, different ways of organizing 
production and collective life (e.g. public canteen systems in communes), etc. The central 
government’s bureaucracy was trimmed; supervision of most state-owned enterprises was 
delegated from the ministries to provinces and cities, and sub-national governments' 
responsibilities were substantially enlarged. Reflecting the first wave of decentralization in the 
late 1950s, the sub-national fiscal revenue to total national fiscal revenue ratio jumped from 20% 
in 1958 to 76% in 1959 (Table 2). 11 
 
Fig 1. Regional Governance Structure of Chinese Economy 
 
 
Source: NSB, 2006; 2006b; 2006c. 
 
Corresponding with the second wave of decentralization in the “Cultural Revolution,” the 
sub-national fiscal revenue (expenditure) to national fiscal revenue (expenditure) ratio increased 
from 65% (37%) in 1966 to 88% (50%) in 1975 (Table 2). 
As a result, at the outset of the reforms, China had already established hundreds of relatively 
self-contained regional economies. The majority of the two thousand counties had SOEs 
producing agricultural machinery, while 300 counties had steel plants. Small regional SOEs 
produced 69% of China’s total fertilizer output and 59% of its total cement. More than 20 
provinces had SOEs producing automobiles or tractors (Xu and Zhuang, 1998). This is in sharp 
contrast to all other formally centralized economies, in which specialization and monopoly are 
                                                        
11  By disturbing central planning and destroying markets, while simultaneously removing local financial 
responsibility, these campaigns degenerated into competitions of exaggerations and lies among sub-national officials, 
which ended up in chaos and eventually created one of the worst catastrophes in world history, in which about 40 
million people died of starvation between 1959 and 1961 (MacFarquhar, 1974, 1983, 1993). 
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hallmarks. With greatly reduced responsibilities, the Chinese central government was much 
smaller than its counterparts in other centralized economies. When the Chinese reforms started 
the number of products directly under the central plan was only 791 (the number was never more 
than one thousand in Chinese centrally planned system), and the number of ministries at the 
centre was less than 30 (Qian and Xu, 1993).12 
 










1953 17.0% 26.1% 554 3.2% 1st Five Year Plan 
1958 19.6% 55.7% 693 8.8%                               
1959 75.6% 54.1% 697 0.6% 
Great Leap 
Forward 
1961 78.5% 55.0% 673 0.0%                               
1966 64.8% 36.9% 753 6.7% 
Cultural 
Revolution 
1975 88.2% 50.1% 874 4.5%                               
1978 84.5% 52.6% 979 9.4% Reform Starts 
1980 75.5% 45.7% 1067 2.6% 
Fiscal reform 
starts 
1984 59.5% 47.5% 1396 10.4%                               
1988 67.1% 66.1% 1816 6.4%                               
1993 78.0% 71.7% 2277 8.5%                               
1994 44.3% 69.7% 2475 8.7% 
Fiscal Sharing 
Rule 
2004 45.1% 72.3%                                   
2005 47.7% 74.1%                                   
Sources for data: China 50 Years’ Statistics; GDP/capita: 1990 international dollars, Maddison (2003). 
 
When the reforms took place, after the end of the Cultural Revolution, sub-national 
governments already de facto controlled a great deal of resources in China. Given this inherited 
governance structure, for both political and economic reasons, granting more autonomous 
powers to sub-national governments is one of the major strategies in the post-Mao reforms, 
particularly during the first fifteen years of the reforms (Deng, 1980, 1986; Shirk, 1993; Liu et al., 
2006; Wu, 2009). Sub-national governments were given strong incentives and were directly 
involved in managing or setting up firms, forming joint ventures with domestic or foreign 
investors, etc. Many sub-national governments have granted de facto property rights to local 
SOEs and collectively owned firms (COEs) within their jurisdictions (Granick, 1990), which 
account for most of the firms in the nation. Moreover, sub-national governments have become 
more important in all regional affairs, from land allocation, business development, infrastructure 
construction, and fiscal matters, to law making and law enforcement. Fiscal decentralization 
                                                        
12 As a comparison, in the Soviet Union the central planning system was based on the principle of functional 
specialization, and the central government directly controlled most of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In the late 




reached its peak in 1993, during which time the sub-national fiscal revenue (expenditure) to 
national fiscal revenue (expenditure) ratio was 78% (72%) (Table 2).   
To analyze the economic incentive and coordination mechanisms of the Chinese RDA 
system, the governance structure is modeled as a stylized multi-regional governance form (M-
form) (e.g., Qian and Xu, 1993; MQX, 2000; and QRX, 2006, 2007). In the M-form hierarchy, 
every region is controlled by the central government politically, whereas each region not only 
enjoys a certain degree of autonomy but also is self-contained in its functions.13 Figure 2 depicts 
a highly stylized Chinese regional governance structure in which each region is self-contained 
(in contrast to specialization): each sub-national government controls major functions such as 
personnel, finance, industry and agriculture etc. within its jurisdiction. As a comparison, in other 
formally centralized economies, specialized ministries control industrial firms and the central 
government is responsible for coordinating the complementary tasks of various ministries.  
 













2.2 Centralized Political Governance 
 
Although highly decentralized economically, China is neither a de jure nor a de facto federal 
state. The backbone of China’s RDA regime is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which 
controls the personnel matters of sub-national governments and commands high economic 
sectors (e.g. banking, energy, telecommunication, railway etc.), as well as controlling ideology 
and the mass media.  
The dominant role of the CCP makes the RDA regime of China fundamentally different 
from a federal system. Firstly, by constitution China is not a federal state. The Chinese 
constitution has been amended during the reforms, reflecting the changes of Chinese political 
and economic institutions. However, both the pre-reform version and the latest version of the 
Constitution stipulate that regions have no inherent power, and regional power is granted by the 
central authorities. The central government is empowered to delegate power to regions, and also 
to rescind this power (PRC Constitution, 1978; PRC Constitutional Amendments, 2004).   
Secondly, China’s RDA regime is not a de facto federal state either. Within the RDA regime, 
Chinese regional leaders are appointed by upper-level governments through the CCP system - 
not by regional elections - despite devolution of much power over economic matters to the sub-
                                                        
13 The term M-form was first used by Chandler (1967) and Williamson (1976) to characterize multi-divisional 
structure of large corporations, where divisions are self-contained and are granted autonomous power, while division 
chiefs are appointed by the headquarters.  
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national governments. While sub-national governments obtain highly autonomous economic 
power, the central government maintains its influence on regional officials’ incentives by 
determining their career paths (Huang, 1996; Landry, 2008). In practice, the central government 
makes decisions on appointment and removal of provincial leaders, e.g. governors. Similarly, 
most municipal leaders, e.g. mayors, are directly controlled by corresponding provincial 
governments. This nested network extends the central government’s personnel control to officials 
of all levels of regions, from provincial to municipal, then to county until the bottom of the 
hierarchy, township government (Burns, 1994). Moreover, reshuffling and cross-region rotation 
of regional leaders is a common practice to keep central control over sub-national officials. From 
1978 to 2005, 80% of provincial regions have experienced rotation of governors imposed by the 
central government (Xu et al., 2007). This personnel control approach is the major instrument 
used to make regional officials comply with the central government’s policy, and also to provide 
incentives for regional experimentation, which I will elaborate on in a later section. Moreover, 
personnel control allows the central government to achieve some macro control, such as 
controlling inflation (Huang, 1996). Furthermore, through this mechanism, the central 
government has maintained considerable influence in consensus-building with sub-national 
governments in order to push through policies that are favorable to the central government 
(Naughton and Yang, 2004). Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that, although this approach 
often worked on high priority issues, it frequently failed on many other important issues (Section 
6 further discusses this).  
 
2.2.1 Evolved Decision-Making Process of the Central Leadership 
 
In this subsection I will discuss how the decision-making process of the CCP central 
leadership evolved and how it works. In the post Mao era, China’s central leadership sees 
economic growth as a life and death matter for the regime. It is important to point out that they 
are not unique among socialist leaders in this aspect. In discussing the general features of 
socialist systems, Kornai (1992, pp.160-161) explains that the socialist leaders promise to 
“eliminate the backwardness very quickly.” And the promise “rests on a belief that they can catch 
up with the developed countries quite fast by virtue of the socialist system’s superiority. This 
belief is a major constituent of the official ideology. The leaders insist on fast growth because it 
will provide further evidence of that superiority.” There is a large literature on “forced growth” in 
former socialist economies (Kornai, 1972, 1992; Ofer, 1987). Indeed, many speeches by Deng 
(e.g. 1987) and other Chinese central leaders concerning the central importance of growth echo 
those of Stalin and Khrushehev.14 Yet, the promise of fast growing was not fulfilled in the last 15 
years of their reforms in former Soviet Union and Central-Eastern Europe until the collapse of 
the system (Kornai, 1986, 1992). What makes China different is that they have transformed the 
system into a mixed economy with an overwhelming private sector and integrated into the global 
economy 
However, this transformation evolved and is not designed by anyone. On the surface, 
China’s reform looks like a “pure” economic reform without a major corresponding political 
                                                        
14 Stalin (1931 [1947, p.356]) said “One feature of the history of the old Russia was the continual beatings she 
suffered …for her backwardness… We are fifty or one hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make 
good this distance in ten years. Either we do it or they crush us.” Khrushehev (1959, pp.76-77) claimed that socialist 
system will outcompete the Western world by faster growth and eventually bury them. 
14 
 
change. 15  Nevertheless, as a matter of fact, the post-Mao reform started from astonishing 
political changes, which resulted in the change of the central leadership, and the change of 
central decision-making process of the CCP. After three decades’ evolution, today’s RDA regime 
is fairly different from the CCP regime during the Mao era, although the political changes were 
restricted to those necessary for enabling economic reform, with focuses on establishing the 
party rules, on personnel changes to weaken those who might block reforms, and on the selection 
mechanism of leadership succession.   
In the pre-reform era, the central decision-making of the CCP was dominated by a 
charismatic figure, Mao Zedong. In the revolutionary era, the CCP was fairly decentralized, in 
that many important decisions were jointly made between central and regional leaders, or made 
by regional leaders. Regional power was a very strong element in the central decision-making 
body of the CCP.16 Soon after the CCP took power in 1949 a dramatic political centralization 
took place. Although a region-based organizational structure was kept, the most influential 
regional leaders were “promoted” as central leaders and were physically moved to Beijing in the 
early 1950s.17 Simultaneously, China transplanted the Soviet central planning regime, and the 
first five year-plan of China was instituted. This centralization served to establish a centrally 
planned economy and was welcomed by the CCP elites. As in the Soviet Union, the objective of 
the CCP was “to build a strong socialist economy” [the 8th National Congress of the CCP, 1956]; 
and most SOEs were controlled centrally by ministries.  
Through significantly weakening regional leadership this centralization substantially 
strengthened Mao’s personal control over the party, from personnel matters to the central 
decision-making process. 18  Mao managed to strengthen the cult of his personality by 
transforming the central decision-making process into a series of political games in which his 
potential rivals were weakened through fighting with each other. Without any rival at the sub-
national level, Mao launched campaigns which delegated substantial power to sub-national 
governments, thus further weakening the power of his rivals in the central government 
(MacFarquhar, 1974, 1983, 1993). The personal control and campaigns mutually reinforced each 
other, and the influence of the campaigns was far reaching. In addition to changing the behaviors 
of the sub-national officials, it deeply affected the governance structure of the party and of the 
state.   
With an extremely ambitious economic growth plan for speeding up China’s transition to a 
Communist society, the Great Leap Forward (GLF) and the People’s Commune Campaigns were 
launched in the late 1950s. Not only did the campaigns once again dramatically decentralize the 
                                                        
15 Given the nature of communist ideology and the radical practice of the CCP in the Mao era, if there was indeed no 
important political change then China’s market reform would indeed look puzzling. “…the Chinese strategy of 
economic reform without political reform appeared to have worked,...”  “The overall economic success of the 
Chinese economic reform experience is surprising because we usually think of communist political institutions as 
rigid and hostile to innovation.” “We expect communist party and government officials to defend their vested 
interests in the command economy by blocking market reforms.” (Shirk, 1993). 
16 For example, in 1949, 8 out of the 15 Politbureau members of the 7th CCP Central Committee were regional 
leaders.   
17 The most prominent figures include Deng Xiaoping – became the CCP General Secretary and was purged in 1967, 
Gao Gang – became the vice President of China and was purged/died in 1954, Chen Yi – became vice Premier and 
was purged in 1967, Xi Zhongxun – became vice Premier and was purged in 1962, and Deng Zihui – became vice 
Premier and was purged in 1962, etc. 
18 In China’s imperial history, during the onset of each dynasty it was typical that a new emperor would centralize 
power to weaken powerful regional rivals, such as warlords, for the sake of consolidating the regime. Mao discussed 
this issue many times. 
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economy as discussed previously, they also changed the central decision-making process. Since 
then, the Chinese economy has sharply deviated from the classical Soviet central planning model.  
The “Cultural Revolution” (CR), launched in 1966, is much more than another wave of 
decentralization. To a large extent, it unintentionally prepared the necessary political and 
institutional conditions for post-Mao reforms. The CR campaign mobilized the masses and CCP 
leaders at all sub-national levels to follow Mao directly to fight against party and government 
bureaucrats.19 There was an anarchy-type of decentralization through which party/government 
organizations at the central and sub-national levels were replaced by mass organizations. The 
mobs enforced strict censorship that any idea different from Mao’s was absolutely not tolerated. 
During this period, with the slogan “down with capitalist runners”, most of the party apparatuses 
and central government bureaucracies were dismantled; most party/state/social elites were 
purged, including the president of the country; regional “revolutionary rebellions,” with self-
proclaimed loyalty to Mao were supported by Mao’s lieutenants and “seized powers (duoquan)” 
at all levels of sub-national governments from the CCP, sometimes through civil wars 
(MacFarquhar and Schoenhals, 2006); and finally, sub-national governments became the most 
important level of government for managing the economy, given that most ministries closed 
down.20 The devastation awakened the majority of the party and social elites and the legitimacy 
of the CCP was deeply shaken through the CR’s overwhelming destruction. All of these paved 
the road to making major changes, to changing the decision-making rules and the objectives of 
the CCP after the death of Mao.21  
The coup d’état of 1976, a few weeks after the death of Mao, in which Madam Mao and her 
lieutenants were arrested, eliminated those who insisted on continuing the CR from both the 
central leadership and  sub-national levels. Consequently, a large number of CCP high officials, 
who were purged during the CR and were keen to make a radical change, returned to power, and 
propaganda campaigns were launched to change the ideology of the CCP from one of class 
struggles to one of economic development.22 The CCP central leaders forged a new consensus on 
the following major issues: a) the monopolistic political power of the CCP must not be 
challenged; b) within the confines of, and to strengthen, condition a), economic development 
should be interpreted as the essence of socialism, and thus of the utmost importance23; c) 
                                                        
19 Two years before launching the CR, Mao warned sub-national officials including county level officials that they 
should refuse to follow and should resist the revisionist central leadership (Xu, 1995) 
20 The self-contained and self-sufficient regionally decentralized structure was further reinforced in the early 1970s 
when most of the counties in the nation were encouraged to setup small industrial firms in five major sectors (Wong, 
1987). 
21 A failed attempt to change the central focus of the CCP before Mao’s death is more than a prelude of the post 1978 
reform. There was a belief among the top CCP leaders that the CR has brought the Chinese economy to the verge of 
collapse and re-focusing the central task of the CCP to the economy is a matter of life and death to the party (in later 
years Deng repeated these arguments many times, e.g. 1980, to justify the changing of the central task of the CCP). 
In 1975 the premier Zhou Enlai together with Deng Xiaoping, a deputy premier after being purged for many years, 
launched the so-called “Four Modernizations” (modernization of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and 
defense) campaign. This campaign represented a rising consensus among most CCP elites. More importantly, they 
underlay a competing legitimacy for the future party leadership. Challenging the revolutionary theme of the CR, this 
de facto reform incited intensive political fights as part of the succession of the CCP’s leadership. Although this 
reform attempt was crushed politically by the left-wing faction with formidable support from Mao, this aborted 
agenda became a platform for changing the CCP and it reminded the CCP reformist elites that a pure economic 
reform would be blocked without  political change. 
22 Before Deng Xiaoping returned to power in late 1978, most of the major changes were lead by Hu Yaobang, the 
minister of the CCP personnel department and the de facto head of the Central Party School (Hu, 2008, 2009).  
23 The following argument of Deng (1987 [1994]) well represents the goal of the CCP: “to build socialism it is 
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regarding the central decision-making process, personalistic regime should be replaced by party 
rule, i.e. a consensus-based collective decision-making process (Deng, 1980 [1984]; Zhao, 2009; 
Li, 2008; Jiang, 2002). This was a watershed period in which the CCP began to transform itself 
from a personality-ruled party into “a system governed by rules, clear lines of authority, and 
collective decision-making institutions” (Shirk 1993). Moreover, economic development has 
become the objective of the party and the state.  
These critical personnel and ideological changes were consolidated in the 3rd Plenum of the 
11th CCP Central Committee in December 1978.24 The communiqué of this plenum became the 
official manifesto for political, ideological and economic change. Consequently, the “Four 
Modernizations,” the slogan of the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP, and 
later “Reform and Open-up,” which replaced the “Four Modernizations” after the 13th Congress 
of the CCP in 1987, emerged as the official objective of the CCP. 
To some extent changing the foundation of legitimacy of the CCP to one of economic 
development does not contradict communist ideology and is not unique to the post-Mao CCP, 
although this may be at odds with other types of dictatorships.25 Perhaps more important than 
ideology, economic development is regarded as essential for the survival of the regime. Yet, the 
much more challenging issue is to find a way to fulfill the objective of economic development. 
Essential issues of how to reform the economy and through which approach the economy should 
be or can be developed were indeed highly contentious among the top CCP leaders (Zhao, 2009). 
Should the economy be developed by restoring the Soviet central planning model, as China did 
in the first five-year plan? Or should it be developed by transforming the economy into a market 
system? Should the political system be reformed together with economic reforms? What should 
be the direction for a political reform? There were sharply different views on these issues among 
the CCP central leaders; more importantly, there were power struggles associated with these 
differing views.26   
                                                                                                                                                                                   
necessary to develop the productive forces. …Not until …we have reached the level of the moderately developed 
countries, shall we be able to say that we have really built socialism and to declare convincingly that it is superior to 
capitalism. We are advancing towards that goal.” 
24 Although the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP officially changed the objective of the CCP 
to economic development under the slogan “the Four Modernizations”, reform was not in the agenda of the Plenum 
(Hu, 2009).  
25 According to Marx, one respect in which socialism is better than capitalism is its higher capacity for advancing 
“productive forces”. Thus, in order to prove the validity of the communist party’s doctrine, it is necessary to deliver 
a higher growth rate than those of capitalist economies. For this reason, most communist leaders in Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe, even including Mao in the 1950s, tried hard to make their economies to grow faster, although 
they all failed eventually. The following argument of Deng (1987 [1994]) well represents the ideology of the post 
1978 CCP, “to build socialism it is necessary to develop the productive forces. …Not until …we have reached the 
level of the moderately developed countries, shall we be able to say that we have really built socialism and to 
declare convincingly that it is superior to capitalism. We are advancing towards that goal.” Indeed the multiple 
decades’ unsuccessful reform efforts in Soviet Union and Eastern European countries were all driven by their 
attempts to regain growth impetus in those economies. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the whole Eastern Bloc 
made the CCP top leaders feel that continued economic development was crucial for the survival of the regime. For 
example, former vice premier Tian Jiyun attributed the collapse of Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc to their 
decades’ failures in improving their productivities (Du M. and Xu Q., 2009). Yet it should be noted that in both 
communist ideology and policy neither “advancing productive forces” nor pursuing high growth rates implies social 
welfare maximization in the sense of neo-classical economics. In reality, all socialist economies have substantially 
smaller shares of consumer consumptions in their GDPs than those of market economies. This indicates that growth 
maximization of socialist economies is divorced from pursuing social welfare. For further analysis and more details 
on forced growth in socialist economies see Kornai (1980; 1992). 
26 Deng Xiaoping, Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang etc. shared a pro-market approach whereas Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, 
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Given the inherited RDA institution, dealing with political risk and technical uncertainty, a 
general reform strategy, marked by a local experiment-based collective central decision making 
process, emerged. Decision-making powers for trying out concrete measures were delegated to 
sub-national governments whereas the central government kept control of strategic political and 
economic issues (Deng, 1980 [1984]). This approach makes a consensus building-based 
decision-making more progressive. 27  Therefore, most strategic decisions on China’s market 
reform were made “collectively” in the form of compromises among the top CCP leaders in a 
trial-and-error process. “Collective” here has a broad meaning in that it includes also sub-
national officials’ contributions through their local policy experiments. 
Political challenges and resistance to a reform are weakened when a new reform is tried only 
in a few regions as experiments, such as the special economic zone experiments (to be further 
discussed in section 4.2). More importantly, for reforms bearing high political risks, the reformist 
central leaders could be vague without making an explicit decision when local experiments were 
allowed without an official endorsement, which implies a central leader will not take serious 
responsibility if something goes wrong with the experiment. The process of the land reform in 
the early 1980s and privatization in the late 1990s, which were major breakthroughs if we 
compare them with the two decades’ reforms in CEE-FSU before 1989, are illustrations of the 
advantage of local experimentation (to be elaborated in sections 4.2 and 5.4). It is also pragmatic 
because the CCP top leaders, including those who pioneered market reform in China, knew little 
about how to transform the Chinese economy into a market economy (Zhao, 2009). It was much 
safer for them to follow some successfully tested reform measures than to implement some 
designed programs.   
Moreover, regional competition helps to contain the impact of conservative ideology, and 
thus is a de facto selection mechanism in local experiment-based central decision-making. 
Indeed, not all central and sub-national officials are pro-market reformists and not all local 
experiments are market reform trials. Just as Chinese regions are heterogeneous, there were all 
kinds of experiments being tried, from egalitarian collectives to private businesses. However, 
outcomes of market reform experiments often dominated other experiments in regional 
competitions, and most of the time what matters most in the decision-making process is 
performance.  
This local experiment-based central decision-making process also makes reform progress 
more stable, since the early reforms created strong interest groups not only among central leaders 
but also among sub-national officials, particularly those who initiated ‘their own experiments’. 
Through the basic operating mechanisms of the RDA regime, the built-in interests and pro-
reform interest groups among sub-national officials became a valuable stabilizer for the reform 
policies. Another important decision process, which establishes the continuity of reform policies 
in long run, is the way the future central and sub-national leaders are selected (I will discuss this 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
Bo Yibo and Hua Guofeng etc. had a strong view insisting on central planning (Deng, 1980; Zhao, 2009; Li, 2008). 
On political aspects, Hu and Zhao pushed for political pluralism within the one party system as a part of the reform. 
Sometimes Chen Yun also proved more amenable to other views for maintaining the party rule rather than 
promoting political pluralism. However, Deng, Li, Bo and most other elder CCP top leaders had strong views 
insisting on strict ideological control combined with repression of political dissidents (Zhao, 2009; Li, 2008; Bao, 
2009). Here, ideological control is essentially about the compliance to the voice of the CCP central leadership, rather 
than any particular theory or doctrine. 
27 “The Chinese government bureaucracy … always made decisions by consensus.” “Consensus decision making 
institutions tend to be conservative because radical departures from the status quo are blocked by vetoes from groups 
who stand to lose.” (Shirk, 1993, p.15)  
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in next part when I deal with the central-regional relationship). Economic development as the 
base of legitimacy for the CCP central leadership has been reinforced during decades of reforms. 
As a result, this objective is codified into the amended constitutions of the Party and the state. 
Capitalist entrepreneurs are officially regarded as part of “advanced social productive forces" and 
are recruited into the party (the CPC Constitution, the 16th CPC Congress, 2002) (see Dickson, 
2003). The Chinese constitution has also been amended to protect private property rights 
(Constitutional Amendment, 2004).  
 
2.2.2 Personnel Control  
Personnel control is a major channel through which the central government controls, 
coordinates and motivates sub-national officials. With this instrument the Chinese RDA regime 
implements a centrally-controlled decentralization, in which most tasks of reforms and economic 
development are carried out by sub-national governments. On the one hand regional officials 
control huge amounts of resources and they enjoy fairly broad autonomies within their 
jurisdictions; on the other hand, their career paths are controlled by the central government. 
Specifically, appointments, promotions and demotions (or more severe punishments, such as 
imprisonment for serious violations of the rules) of sub-national officials in China are ultimately 
determined by the central government, and their career paths are tied to the performance of their 
jurisdictions. This makes Chinese economy fundamentally different from a federal system.28  
This personnel control system is a nested network in which the centre directly controls the 
key positions at provincial level and grants each tier of sub-national government the power to 
appoint key officials one level below it. Each level of sub-national government oversees the 
appointment, evaluation, promotion and dismissal of its subordinate-level regional leaders.  
A set of performance criteria for leading officials at sub-national governments is stipulated 
by the level of government above it. Regional officials are assessed in accordance with the 
important tasks and targets laid down by their superior level of governments. Level by level, 
each level of sub-national government negotiates with their subordinate sub-national government 
for performance targets. Then, regional officials at different levels sign target responsibility 
contracts with their superiors. The targets for the tasks to be attained as well as rewards/penalties 
contingent on the fulfillment of those targets are specified in those contracts (Tsui and Wang, 
2004). For example, in a scheme for provincial leading officials, 60 percent of these leaders were 
assigned to targets related to economic construction (Tsui and Wang, 2004). In general, 
performance criteria are broader for leading officials at higher level sub-national governments, 
while the targets set for leading officials at lower level sub-national governments tend to be more 
precisely defined. According to a handbook issued by the Party, work achievement accounts for 
60 to 70 percent of the evaluation of regional officials, while other aspects, such as political 
integrity, competence and diligence together account for the rest, 30 to 40 percent (Edin, 2003). 
It is also documented that county governments control township and village officials by 
linking their performance to promotion (Whiting, 2000). In field works at township-level 
governments, it has been found that party secretaries and township heads sign performance 
contracts with the county level. In these contracts, township officials pledge to achieve targets 
established by county officials, and are held personally responsible for attaining those targets. 
Performance targets are ranked in three categories: soft targets, hard targets and priority targets 
                                                        
28 It is interesting to note that this governance structure of Chinese government, i.e. a combination of a centralized 
personnel control and a decentralized operation/implementation, shares some similarities with the Japanese 
corporate governance structure, particularly before the 1990s (Aoki, 1990). 
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with veto power. Hard targets tend to be economic, such as an economic development plan and 
tax revenue, whereas priority targets are often political, such as keeping social order. Fulfilling 
hard targets is important for bonuses and for political rewards, whereas completion of priority 
targets affects personnel decisions (Edin, 2003).  
Moreover, competition between regional officials among the same level, such as at the 
county level or township level, is an essential part of the cadre management system. As 
discovered in field work in one county, leading cadres of the first three ranked townships in the 
annual evaluation were recognized as “advanced leaders”, whereas the bottom 5 percent of 
officials on the list were disgraced. To be a top-ranking township leader and to be awarded with 
the title of “advanced leader” enhances the chances for promotion substantially, and thus it is 
regarded as a “political bonus.” Indeed, some first-ranked township officials were promoted 
within the county (Edin, 2003).  
To enhance the effectiveness of the personnel control system, rotation and cross-region 
transfer are also deployed. The practice of rotating provincial level officials has always existed, 
and it has been further institutionalized since the 1990s. The Central Committee of the CCP has 
issued Party decrees on the rotation system in 1990, 1994, 1999 and 2006.  The Party decrees 
announce that a major purpose of rotating regional officials is to promote economic development 
through diffusion or duplication of regional reform experiences (Xu et al., 2007).29 Directed by 
this policy, during the period between 1978 and 2005, about 80% of governors were promoted or 
transferred from other provinces, i.e. many of them were not promoted within the same province. 
The average duration of their tenures within a given province is close to four years, while 
ranging from as little as one year to as many as ten years (Xu et al., 2007).  
It has been documented that during the reform era, rotation was often combined with 
promotion. The rotation/promotion combination was frequently used to promote mayors of 
successful municipalities to be governors of other provinces, particularly under-performing 
provinces. This promotion path creates incentives for regional leaders to work hard. Moreover, 
this may also serve as a mechanism to diffuse successful regional experimentation (in Section 4 
we will further discuss regional experiments). For example, between 1998 and 2004 three former 
party secretaries of Suzhou, one of the best-performing municipalities in China, were promoted 
to become provincial governors of Jiangsu, Shaanxi and Jilin. Between 1998 and 2002, a former 
mayor of Wenzhou, another top-performing municipality, was appointed as vice-governor and 
then governor of Sichuan (Chien and Zhao, 2007). 
 
 
2.3 Central-Regional Relationship 
 
The central-regional (or central-local) relationship has always been one of the most 
important issues when considering China’s governance. Although the formal structure is 
hierarchical between central and regional governments, the authority of the central government is 
endogenized insofar as the power of the national leadership depends on the collective support of 
the regional leaders as well. This sophisticated structure plays important roles in the operation of 
the RDA regime, such as continuing effective national macroeconomic policies, encouraging 
regional initiatives, and balancing central-local interests.  
One of the most important governance mechanisms of the RDA regime is the selection 
                                                        
29 Historically rotation was a common practice in the Chinese Empire to prevent regional officials from cultivating 
strong political power bases within their jurisdictions. 
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process for the future central and sub-national leaders. The process includes nominations and 
approvals. Nomination by top leaders is necessary for anyone to become a central leader 
candidate, but nomination alone provides no guarantee for the future of the candidates. A 
nominee must convince most of the top leaders that he both shares their core values and 
principles, and he has the capability to perform. As such, excellent performance at the provincial 
level becomes necessary for anyone to be nominated and eventually promoted as a top leader. 
Although this requirement may not be codified formally, without a single exception, from 1992 
to 2008 every president, every premier, and every newly elected Politbureau Standing Committee 
member of the four CCP congresses 30  during this period was promoted from a provincial 
position; i.e. none of them were from a ministerial or other central agency position. The 
appointment of sub-national level officials follows a somewhat similar consensus-based selection 
processes, with intensive interactions between upper and lower-level governments. In addition to 
major impacts on both the sub-national officials’ career paths and the pool of future top national 
leader candidacy, these procedures also act as institutions which balance national and regional 
interests.  
Supported by commonly-shared collective interests among most national and sub-national 
officials, the central leadership enjoys considerable authority over potentially disobedient 
regional leaders. With this authority, the central government takes a tough stand to make the sub-
national governments comply on the most important issues, such as national (or political) unity 
and macro stability. Personnel control is often used as the last resort for enforcement to 
guarantee the implementation of central policies.31 
At the same time, as previously discussed, on regional economic issues the central 
government is often fairly hands-off. Sub-national governments are granted sizeable de jure 
control rights and endowed with even greater de facto control rights over most economic issues 
and resources within their jurisdictions. Together with a highly incomplete personnel control 
regime – although it is highly structured and effective, it is ambiguous on many issues and there 
are gaps in other issues – the delegation of power to regional governments is also highly 
incomplete (a la Pistor and Xu, 2004). For most issues, as long as the central government does 
not have an explicit policy, by default the regional governments would be in the position to make 
decisions within their jurisdiction. However, the central government retains the power to 
intervene. The incompleteness of personnel control and power delegation is partly a result of 
compromises, and partly a design for encouraging more local initiatives from local governments, 
while still remaining open to central control. At the same time, this regime also makes it possible 
for sub-national governments to maneuver against, rather than to simply comply, with policies of 
the central government. 
To understand the distinctive feature of China’s RDA regime, such as the enablement of 
local governments, it is worthwhile to point out its origin and its robustness in history. The basic 
governance structure of China’s RDA regime is originated from the birth of the Chinese empire 
and has evolved over two thousand years, which has supported the empire to last so much longer 
than all other empires in the world history,32 and has a long lasting impact on the governance of 
today’s China.33  
                                                        
30 A common practice of the CCP is to put the selected next top leader(s) into the Politbureau Standing Committee.  
31 When a few regional leaders defy the central government and challenge the power of the central government, they 
are punished severely. Recent examples include the dismissal and imprisonment of the former mayor of Beijing, 
Chen Xitong, in 1995, and the former mayor of Shanghai, Chen Liangyu, in 2006. 
32 It is well known that institutions of most of the countries in the world have a European origin through their 
imperial histories, e.g. the UK and France; or colonial histories, e.g. the Americans, Africa and South Asia; or 
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Designed at the beginning of the Qin Dynasty (221 BC), sub-national government officials 
were appointed by the Emperor (Sima, 1993 [109 BC]). This assures the strategic control of 
emperor over the nation. Given the primitiveness in communication and transportation at that 
time, most local affairs were delegated to sub-national governments, conditional on their loyalty 
to the Emperor. To enable sub-national governments’ effective control they are assigned with 
self-contained functions that each of them was able to coordinate operations within its 
jurisdiction. This is true at all levels of sub-national governments. To illustrate the self-contained 
governance structure at every level of sub-national governments, the following Figure 3 depicts a 
stylized structure similar to that of imperial China during the Ming and Qing dynasties (1368-
1910), in which the empire divided the central government’s functions into six ministries. The 
most important ministry was Personnel, which determined the appointment and promotion of 
central and provincial officials. This structure extends to the bottom administrative level, the 
county level. Just like in the central government and at the provincial level, a typical county 
(xian) government controlled the six corresponding offices within its jurisdiction (Bai, 1996).34 A 
caveat is in order that during imperial times there was no political party, such as the CCP, which 
makes today’s RDA regime historically unique.   
 













The consensus-based decision making process and personal control system of the RDA 
regime provide mechanisms for upholding a balance between economic decentralization and 
political compliance. These mechanisms allow the regime to evolve while keeping the central-
regional relationship basically stable. 35  There were deep worries that delegating economic 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
voluntary adoptions of the European institutions, e.g. Russia, Japan. But it is well noticed that China has neither 
been colonized by Europe nor adopted European institutions systematically before the 1950s, when it adopted an 
institution from the Soviet Union. This is the underlying reason why on many facets China looks inconsistent with 
the regularities discovered in cross country studies. 
33 Indeed Mao frequently referred to the governance approach of imperial times, perhaps more than his discussions 
on Marxism and the Soviet System. 
34 The six ministries at the central government are Ministries of Personnel (li), Finance (hu), Civil Service Exam and 
Foreign Affaires (li), Military (bing), Justice (xing), and Manufacturing (gong), i.e. li-hu-li-bing-xing-gong liu-bu. 
The six similar offices at each county government are li-hu-li-bing-xing-gong liu-fang. Here, bu and fang are in 
bold to highlight the difference between the central government (six ministries, liu-bu) and a local government (six 
offices, liu-fang). 
35 It has been reported that during the reform era, in a period of more than two decades, the provincial share in the 
Politburo of the CCP increased slightly; meanwhile, the provincial share in the Central Committee of the CCP 
declined by a similar magnitude (Sheng, 2005). 
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powers to regions undermined the capacity of the central power (Wang, 1995). And in the early 
period of the reform, the time associated with much regional decentralization, the central 
government’s share of national total fiscal revenue declined substantially. When the economy 
was growing rapidly and some regional governments enjoyed high surpluses, the national 
government ran deficits and had to borrow from some provinces. Moreover, central power could 
be further weakened by the enfranchisement of regional leaders in Party institutions during 
national-level successions (Shirk, 1993)36. It was argued that capacity of the central government 
was undermined so severely during the reform era that this weakened capacity threatened 
Chinese political unity in a manner similar to the situation before the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia (Wang and Hu, 2001). Responding to the worse central fiscal capacity and weakened 
central control over bank lending - which led to central government deficits, excessive lending, 
and inflation in the early 1990s - the central government increased its political and administrative 
control over provincial government leaders to co-ordinate and implement national economic 
policies (Huang, 1996a,b; Naughton and Yang, 2004; Landry, 2008). During this time, the 
central government took away some powers from sub-national governments. Tax collection was 
re-centralized in 1994, and control over bank lending was also shifted away from sub-national 
governments (Tsui and Wang, 2004). However, this fiscal recentralization did not fundamentally 
change the RDA regime and did not terminate regional decentralization. These should instead be 
viewed as efforts to maintain a balance between the interests of national and sub-national 
governments. Regional governments’ losses in tax revenue were compensated by other means, 
such as extra-budgetary and non-budgetary revenues (Wong, 1997), and their losses in 
controlling bank lending were compensated by stronger controls over land and state assets within 
their jurisdictions (subsection 6.1 discusses consequences of these changes).  
 
2.4 General Remarks  
 
The decision-making process of China’s RDA regime relies on building consensuses among 
the top leaders - often including provincial leaders - and regional experiments, which keeps a 
balance between national and regional interests. This mechanism generates outcomes which are 
somewhat similar to what occurs through negotiations in a legislative body. Moreover, together 
with the selection process of national and sub-national leaders, these mechanisms nurture interest 
groups of market-oriented and growth-oriented reforms within the party, which contributes to 
stable market reforms over several decades. 
Although China’s RDA regime is evolved from China’s unique history (e.g. the longest 
imperial history in the world and the unprecedented events of the Cultural Revolution), which 
makes its policy lessons less relevant directly for other countries, there are important general 
lessons for debates on decentralization. Firstly, for developing and transition economies, 
focusing on fiscal decentralization can be misleading for both understanding and policies. 
Secondly, extreme decentralization in general may not be optimal. If China went down a path of 
extreme decentralization in which all provinces became completely autonomous except in 
military and foreign affairs, even assuming away potential political instability, without an active 
central government all the benefits from the combination of collective decision-making and 
regional experimentation would disappear; negative externalities cross regions would become 
                                                        
36 Shirk (1993) argues that the content and sequencing of China’s economic reforms are determined by the ongoing 
succession struggles of the Party, whereas devolution gave central politicians the opportunity to win the gratitude 
and the political support of officials from the provinces. 
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prevailing; and no one would take care of positive externalities across regions. Moreover, the 
nature of regional competition and regional experiments would be fundamentally weakened (to 
be discussed in Sections 3 and 4).   
 
3. Regional Competition and Sub-national Governments’ Incentives for Reforms 
A distinctive feature of China’s reform is the vital roles played by highly motivated sub-
national governments. Governors Zhao Ziyang of Sichuan and Wan Li of Anhui initiated land 
reform experiments in a few localities within their jurisdictions in the late 1970s when the 
national policy, including the Party’s “reform” manifesto, did not allow any ownership change to 
collective farming. Similarly, governor Xi Zhongxun of Guangdong proposed the special 
economic zone reform while some top central leaders were hostile to this reform plan (sections 4 
will elaborate on this below). Later, when those locally initiated reforms were endorsed by the 
central government as national policies, the reforms were implemented by all levels of 
government nationwide. After the initial success of the regional reforms, these reform pioneers 
were all promoted to national level posts. Zhao and Wan became the premier and executive 
deputy premier of the state council, respectively, responsible for national reform; Xi became a 
vice Chairman of the National People’s Congress.  
As the pioneers and architects of regional reform, the political risks they faced were 
substantial. The key issue I will address in this section is how sub-national government officials 
are motivated to initiate and to implement reforms. Without a solution to incentive problems of 
government officials at all levels of government, reform would not be carried out successfully or 
potentially not even be attempted. There is no question that some reformists have intrinsic 
personal motivations (a la Prendergast, 2007) to push forward reforms. For those officials with 
intrinsic motivations to reform, the only incentive that needs to be devised is to give them the 
power to initiate and to implement reforms. However, extra incentives, i.e. extrinsic incentives, 
are necessary for most sub-national officials to take risks and to work hard for reforms. 
Furthermore, very often well-devised extrinsic incentives can induce stronger intrinsic incentives 
and vice-versa, so that the two incentives often reinforce each other at equilibrium (a la Benabou 
and Tirole, 2003). By the same logic, poorly devised or destructive extrinsic incentives could 
weaken or even destroy intrinsic motivations for reforms. In this section, I will focus on the 
extrinsic incentives provided to Chinese sub-national officials. My major argument is that inter-
regional competition has motivated sub-national officials to push forward reforms. Chinese 
regions (provinces, municipalities, counties and townships) compete against each other for 
performance rankings;37 and regional officials’ careers are linked to their performance in the 
“tournaments.” 
As bureaucrats appointed by their upper level governments, most Chinese sub-national 
officials are very much motivated by their career concerns, which are basically about climbing 
ladders within the government hierarchy. Through this channel the central government affects the 
ultimate incentives of the sub-national officials. It is noteworthy that this mechanism is 
fundamentally different from the well-known jurisdictional Tiebout competition, or in general 
fiscal jurisdictional competition in the fiscal federalism literature. The latter has nothing to do 
                                                        
37 The most popular performance indicators used in regional rankings are GDP (total or per capita), GDP growth rate, 
and FDI etc. In addition, some other indicators, such as regional competitiveness in various aspects, are also widely 
reported. For example, in a recent ranking Shanghai, Beijing and Guangdong were ranked as the first, second and 
third most competitive regions in China in 2007, which is unchanged from those in 2006; whereas inland provinces 
Anhui and Hubei improved their rankings significantly (Xinhua, 10/03/2008).  
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with the internal promotion of the local government officials. Instead, local officials are driven 
by their fiscal motives, e.g. maximizing property values within their jurisdictions by attracting 
additional residents (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1999); or by winning votes from their constituencies 
(Epple and Zelenitz, 1981).  
 
 3.1 The Institutional Foundation for Regional Tournament Competition 
In this subsection I elucidate how China’s RDA institution creates the conditions for regional 
competition, as well as the tradeoffs of this regional competition. When the reform era started in 
the late 1970s, regional governments were encouraged to find ways to develop faster than other 
regions. Policies on special economic zones and other economic development zones were 
implemented, enabling sub-national governments’ competition for investments. Regions compete 
for economic growth, and for attracting FDI etc. Since the mid-1980s, many better-performing 
counties were upgraded to the municipal level, which further enabled and empowered these local 
governments. At the same time, this city status upgrading also provides high incentives to all the 
county governments to compete for the opportunity to be promoted. Government statistics and 
mass media regularly publish rankings of regional performance, which become an important part 
of evaluations for determining sub-national government officials' promotions.  
In contrast to the prevalence of regional competition and initiatives taken by sub-national 
governments in Chinese reforms, officials in other reforming countries or other transitional 
economies were not given similar competitive incentives and they were in general less active in 
taking initiatives than their Chinese counterparts. Yet, decentralization does not automatically 
create strong incentives to regional officials for regional economic growth, as can be seen in 
most other countries. What makes China special in providing strong incentives to regional 
officials for economic development? Furthermore, there is serious potential problems associated 
with decentralization, such as regional protection and regional environment problems, etc. What 
are the conditions under which regional competition leads to desirable outcomes?  
To address the first question, let me start with a summary of the major features of 
Chinese institutions which facilitate regional competition. First, Chinese sub-national officials 
are subject to incentive schemes managed by the central government. With centralized personnel 
management for sub-national officials, regional competition under this institutional structure is 
qualitatively different from fiscal federalist regional competition, in which local officials are 
elected (Epple and Zelenitz, 1981). Second, the Chinese national government not only possesses 
superior powers of appointment, promotion and dismissal of subordinate government officials, 
but it is also strong enough to eliminate collusions between lower level sub-national 
governments. This preserves tournament-like regional competition, since collusion among sub-
national officials can make competition impossible. Third, Chinese regions, particularly county 
level or higher level regions, have historically been and remain relatively self-sufficient in that 
each region contains multiple economic sectors. Therefore, most Chinese regions are alike in 
their economic structures, which is a critical condition for tournament like competition to 
function (discussed in more detail below). Moreover, this greatly weakens interdependence 
among Chinese regions, and enables sub-national governments to coordinate most of the 
economic activities within their jurisdictions. Finally, Chinese sub-national governments are both 
enabled and empowered to take responsibility for economies within their jurisdictions. They are 
granted a fairly high degree of autonomy on economic activities. Enablement and empowerment 
themselves are vital sources of incentives. Ultimately, incentives for officials can play important 
roles only when those officials are enabled and empowered to take reform initiatives or growth-
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enhancing measures, etc. 
The theoretical model of Maskin, Qian and Xu (2000; MQX, hereafter) highlights the 
relationship between China’s RDA regime and high-powered incentives associated with regional 
competition, which includes tournament-like competition. 38  The stylized hierarchical 
organization modelled by MQX captures the feature of the RDA regime.39 There are two types of 
authoritarian structures considered in the model: a multi-regional organizational form (M-form), 
such as China, in which there are two unspecialized sub-national regions, each of which is 
assigned to manage similar tasks such as manufacturing and agriculture; and a unitary form (U-
form), such as the former Soviet Union before 1991, in which there are two specialized sub-
national units - ministries - each of which is assigned with managing a specialized task such as 
manufacturing or agriculture. In contrast with China, in those economies there were no 
ministerial or regional competitions in reform measures or growth-enhancing efforts, even 
though they started reforms much earlier than China. The MQX model focuses on incentive 
issues of sub-national officials in order to address the following questions: What is the specific 
mechanism that makes regional competition effective in China? And what prevented the FSU-
CEE countries from deploying a similar approach?  
As in any incentive theory, the outcomes of the tasks are determined jointly by the 
managing efforts of the relevant officials and outside random factors. The officials’ efforts are 
not observable to others and are costly to them; therefore, when there is no proper incentive 
scheme, there will be no reform efforts. It is known that when facing unobservable efforts, 
tournament competition can motivate agents better than other incentives schemes (e.g. Lazear 
and Rosen, 1981). However, an effective tournament competition requires that the tasks of the 
agents should be similar, and that the outside random factors faced by the agents should follow 
the same distribution. The rigidness of these conditions makes these models hard to apply 
directly to real-world institutions.  
The MQX model extends the basic idea of tournament competition to different 
institutions organized in different ways, which determines how tasks are assigned and how 
information is used by each official. These in turn determine the effectiveness of different 
incentive schemes for the officials in the regime. Given that Chinese regions are alike in their 
economic compositions, which implies that shocks to regions are highly correlated, by assigning 
similar tasks to regional officials and delegating power to them in order to carry out regional 
reforms, regional competition among them can serve as an effective incentive scheme. To 
understand the mechanism, let us suppose a governor performs poorly and tries to blame the 
outcome on bad luck in his region. This excuse is unconvincing, however, if all other similar 
regions are prospering. Therefore, facing the comparison (or competition) with other regions 
should force every governor to work hard.   
On the contrary, if sub-national units are highly specialized so that they are not 
comparable, or if tasks assigned to every official are idiosyncratic, which implies that shocks to 
these tasks are not correlated, such as ministries in former Soviet Union and Central-Eastern 
Europe before 1989, it is easy for a minister to blame a poor outcome on bad luck in his 
industrial sector and it is difficult to object to his excuse, given that performance is imperfectly 
correlated with officials’ efforts. That is, ministerial tournament will not be efficient when tasks 
                                                        
38 Interpreting the MQX model as a mechanism of the RDA regime is my personal view.  
39 In addition to authoritarian regimes, the MQX model also applies to large corporations. This is not coincidental as 
the Chinese authoritarian regime is sometimes regarded as corporate technocrat-ship or corporatism in the literature 
(e.g. Oi, 1999). 
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and information of ministries are sufficiently different from each other. Therefore, although 
distributions of industry-specific shocks and of region-specific shocks are exogenous, they affect 
officials’ incentives differently under different organizational forms. 
Two types of incentives are analysed in the MQX model: the absolute performance incentive, 
which ties an official’s compensation to his own outputs, and the relative performance incentive, 
which links an official’s compensation to other’s outputs in a negative way. The absolute 
performance incentive is inversely related to the noise level of each official’s own performance, 
while the relative performance incentive is positively related to the correlation between the 
performances of two officials. In summarizing the two factors, the incentives of officials in any 
regime depend on the variance-covariance matrices of the exogenous random shocks. Fortunately, 
the essential information of variance-covariance matrices can be sufficiently compressed into a 
scalar, the conditional variation measurement. A smaller conditional variation implies a smaller 
variation and a larger correlation, i.e. a higher quality of information for incentive purposes.  
In a highly simplified version of the model, for an economy organized in U-form, the middle 
officials will be ministries responsible for industries 1 and 2; and the corresponding industrial 
shocks are denoted as 1 and 2. The information relevant to the incentives of the two ministers is 
summarized by the conditional variances Var(1│2) for minister 1 and 2 1( )Var    for minister 2. 
For an economy organized in M-form, the middle officials are governors responsible for regions 
A and B, and the corresponding regional shocks are denoted as A and B. The information 
relevant to the governors’ incentives is summarized by the conditional variances ( )A BVar   for 
governor A and ( )B AVar   for governor B.  
Therefore, if Var(1│2) > ( )A BVar   , then the information quality for evaluating governor 
A in the M-form is higher than that for minister 1 in the U-form. In general, if Var(i│j) > 
Var(r│s) (hereafter this condition will be referred to as Condition A), for all i, j =1, 2 and for 
all r, s = A, B, we will conclude that, everything else being equal, regional competition with 
relative performance evaluations under the M-form is more effective than ministerial competition 
under the U-form. Therefore, the M-form will be able to provide better incentives to their 
governors than the U-form for ministers. Of course, if Condition A is reversed for every pair-
wise comparison, the conclusion will be reversed. Therefore, ultimately, whether regional 
decentralization is more beneficial than a centralized regime is an empirical matter, and the 
MQX model provides a methodology to test it.  
 
3.2 Evidence  
Three forms of systematic evidences on the relationship between China’s RDA regime and 
regional competition will be presented in this subsection. The first evidence concerns whether or 
not China’s RDA regime provides better conditions, in terms of Condition A, for jurisdictional 
competition than a centralized authoritarian regime. Then, I survey evidence that regional 
competition provides incentives to regional officials. The last evidence suggests that China’s 
RDA regime has made a significant contribution to China’s growth. 
Using a firm-level dataset of Chinese state-owned enterprises from 1986 to 1991, MQX 
finds that Chinese regions are indeed ‘alike’ in the sense that regional competition should work 
better than ministerial competition. The dataset contains industry classification codes and 
location codes for each firm, and industry-specific shocks and region-specific shocks are 
estimated by running the log-linear Cobb-Douglas production function. This allows for 
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calculation of regional and industrial conditional variations. In their sample, 70% of the results 
satisfied Condition A and there is no single case that the Condition A is reversed.  
To address the question of whether relative performance evaluations are actually used in 
China, MQX investigates the relationship between the promotion of regional officials and 
regional economic performance. They use regional representation in the CCP’s Central 
Committee as a proxy for the promotion chances of officials in that region and measure the 
economic performance of a region by its growth rate in national income. Then they investigate 
how the improvement of a region’s performance relative to other regions would later affect the 
promotion of this region’s officials. Specifically, they constructed a national ranking index of 
each province’s representation at the 11th Party Congress in 1977 and in the 13th Party Congress 
in 1987, and constructed a national ranking index of provincial economic performance lagged by 
one year, as measured by growth rates in the year before the Party Congress, that is, in 1976 and 
in 1986. The evidence shows that officials from relatively better-performing regions have a better 
chance of being promoted, suggesting that tournament-like regional competition is at work.  
Similarly, using data covering 344 top provincial leaders (187 party secretaries and 157 
governors) from China’s 28 provinces for the period from 1979 to2002, Chen, Li and Zhou 
(2005) find that provincial officials’ performances relative to the national average and to their 
immediate predecessors had significant impacts on their promotions (columns 5 and 6 in Table 
3). The left-side variable of all the regressions in the Table 3 is turnover, i.e. the probability of 
termination, staying at the same level, or promotion.  
Using a panel dataset covering 254 provincial leaders (provincial party secretaries and 
governors), who served in 28 Chinese provincial units from 1979 to 1995, Li and Zhou (2005) 
find that regional officials’ promotions are determined by the performance of their jurisdiction 
relative to the national average. Everything else being equal, for those provinces that surpass the 
average growth rate by one standard deviation from the mean, their leader would increase the 
probability of his promotion by 33% of the average probability of promotion; and, those that 
performed worse than the mean by one standard deviation would increase the probability of 
termination by 30% of the average probability of termination (columns 3 and 4 in Table 3). In 
the table, the punishment for the worst performers is shown as an estimated coefficient with cut-
off point 1. Overall, the marginal effects of growth performance on turnover are large.  
By separating provincial party secretaries from governors, Sheng (2009) finds evidence that 
provincial GDP growth mattered for the political fortunes of governors but not those of party 
secretaries. This may capture the division of labour between party secretaries and governors in 
the RDA regime given that the former were responsible for party affairs, such as personnel 
control etc., whereas the latter were put in charge of running the provincial economy. 
Nevertheless, considering the fact that most provincial party secretaries served previously as 
governors, their records on provincial economic performance must have already played a role in 
their promotion to become secretaries. 
Of course, the promotion of regional officials is not solely determined by their performances 
in economic affairs. In most columns of Table 3, many of the non-economic performance factors 
are controlled. One of them is the impact of regional officials’ connections with the central 
government on their promotion, which is measured by their previous or current work experience 
in the central government. The central connection indicator has a positive and significant impact. 
Comparing columns 3 and 4 with columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 indicate that promotion and 
termination appear more sensitive to the average growth rate than to the annual growth rate. 
They suggest that the long-run or average measure weigh more in turnover decisions than those 
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of short-term shocks.   
 
Table 3. The Effect of Economic Performance on the Turnover of Provincial Leaders 
(Ordered Probit Regressions) 
 dependent variable: turnover (0=termination, 1=same level, 2=promotion) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Provincial annual GDP 
growth rate 
1.615** 1.581*     
(2.05) (1.87)     
Provincial average 
GDP growth rate 
  4.727*** 4.540***   
  (4.34) (3.90)   
Provincial average 
per capita GDP growth 
rate (A) 
    3.001**  
    (2.10)  
Provincial average 
per capita GDP growth 
rate of the immediate 
    -3.584**  
    (2.36)  
(A)-(B)      3.309***      (3.41) 
Age  -0.026*  -0.023* -0.071*** -0.070***  (-1.91)  (-1.68) (6.81) (6.77) 
Age65  -0.974***  -0.976*** -0.303** -0.303**  (-5.27)  (-5.25) (2.07) (2.07) 
Education  0.154  0.187 0.183 0.184  (0.96)  (1.17) (1.48) (1.5) 
Central connection  0.384***  0.404*** 0.082 0.085  (2.79)  (2.89) (0.74) (0.77) 
Tenure  -0.053*  -0.055* -0.062** -0.062**  (-1.74)  (-1.78) (2.44) (2.45) 
Lagged per capita GDP 
(million yuan) 
 0.080  0.010   
 (0.43)  (0.05)   
Cutoff point 1 -1.320*** -3.162*** -2.850*** -2.850*** -6.992*** -6.929*** (-3.67) (-2.98) (-2.64) (-2.63) (8.42) (8.66) 
Cutoff point 2 1.621*** 0.106 0.455 0.455 -3.736*** -3.662*** (4.63) (1.01) (0.43) (0.43) (4.64) (4.7) 
Number of 
observations 864 864 864 864 1227 1227 Note: The numbers in parentheses are t-ratios based on robust standard errors. The significance levels of 1%, 5% 
and 10% are noted by ***, ** and *. All regressions include the provincial and year indicators. Columns (1)-(4) are 
based on Li and Zhou (2005), and columns (5) and (6) are based on Chen, Li and Zhou (2005). 
 
In addition to providing incentives through appointment and promotion within the 
hierarchical structure, the decentralization-based reforms also further delegate autonomies to 
sub-national governments through various channels. One of those is the city status upgrading 
scheme. In the city status upgrading scheme, municipal governments are granted more 
administrative authority and the political position of a city is raised, thus more strongly 
incentivizing its officials. One of these kinds of practices is to upgrade some county governments 
as city governments (county-to-city upgrading). From 1983 to 2001, 430 county-level cities were 
established, mostly by upgrading (Li, 2009). Another method is to upgrade some prefecture level 
municipalities to the deputy provincial rank city, which is officially called separately-itemized 
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cities (jihua danlie), meaning that they enjoy substantial autonomy and are treated separately 
from the province in which they are located. Since 1984, 14 cities have obtained deputy 
provincial rank (Shi and Zhou, 2007).  
Using a large panel data set covering all counties in China from 1993 to 2004, after 
controlling for the official upgrading requirements, such as industrialization, population and 
fiscal strength, Li (2009) finds that, everything else being equal, counties with a higher growth 
rate were more likely to get city status. He interprets this as evidence that upgrading is used by 
the central government as an incentive mechanism to align regional interests with the national 
ones. Shi and Zhou (2007) show that everything else being equal, cities obtaining deputy 
provincial rank, i.e. a greater degree of autonomy, increased per capita GDP by an additional 
9.3%, per capita FDI by more than 50%, and per capita investment by about 80%. This indicates 
that enabling and empowering sub-national governments by granting them more autonomy 
power together with high-powered incentives enhances regional economic growth effectively. 
All of the above surveyed papers do not pay special attention to the potential reverse 
causality problem, except for applying some time-lags. One might challenge these findings by 
imagining that a governor who was already picked to assume important positions in the central 
government in the future being assigned to a province with fast economic growth to show his 
performance. That is, instead of career concern motivating regional development, the findings 
may be interpreted as placing favourable future leaders into easy performing regions to justify 
their later promotion.  
Indeed, a clear-cut econometric study which rules out a reverse causality has yet to be done. 
Nevertheless, if we combine all the results from the literature, the overall picture should be 
reasonably convincing that a reverse causality is not most likely. First, to improve the chance of 
being promoted, a governor not only should perform better than average (LZ result); but also 
should be better than his/her immediate predecessor (CLZ results), which makes the reversed 
causality argument uneasy. Second, if a governor performed really poorly for several years, the 
likelihood of his/her losing the governorship is substantially increased. It is hard to imagine that 
poor performance for many years is unrelated to this governor’s own actions.   
Finally, in the analysis and evidence discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 the government is 
focused on economic growth, or growth enhancing reforms. Under this condition, tournament-
like regional competition creates powerful positive incentives to sub-national officials. However, 
when the government’s task is expanded to many other potentially conflicting tasks, such as 
managing inequality, protecting environment, and maintaining social stability etc., regional 
competition may create strong negative effects. This is discussed in Section 6. 
 
3.3 Chinese Regional Competition and the Debate on Fiscal Federalism 
There is a large literature that debates whether the quality of public fiscal policy can be 
improved through regional competition or fiscal federalism in general. The seminal Tiebout 
model (1956) shows that jurisdictional competition among sub-national governments can make 
the provision of public goods more efficient. Along this line of thinking, a market-preserving 
fiscal federalism develops an argument which says that, under certain conditions, fiscal 
federalism is self-enforcing and is market-preserving. The core mechanism is the commitment 
mechanism created by certain fiscal federalism which prevents the national government from 
intervention, which in turn provides proper incentives to government officials at all levels to 
encourage market growth (Weingast, 1995). China is often seen as a major example of market-
preserving fiscal federalism (Montinola, Qian and Weingast (MQW), 1995; Qian and Weingast, 
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1997; Jin, Qian and Weingast (JQW), 2005).  
At the same time there is also a fairly sizeable literature that challenges fiscal federalism on 
many aspects. First, inter-jurisdictional competition for capital may lead to a ‘race-to-the bottom’ 
in local tax rates, or in reduced provision of some local public goods (Keen and Marchand, 1997). 
It may prompt local governments to exploit possible spill-over to other jurisdictions, exporting 
taxes or pollution to their neighbors (Gordon, 1983; Oates and Schwab, 1988), and central 
government intervention may be necessary to solve such problems (Cumberland, 1981; Gordon, 
1983; Rivlin, 1992; Wildasin, 1989). Without a strong central government, fiscal federalism 
alone will not lead to efficient results and will not be market-preserving (Blanchard and Shleifer, 
2001). Second, interregional competition for capital may encourage sub-national governments to 
act in ways that corrode the capacities of the central state such that fiscal federalism will not be 
market-preserving (Cai and Triesman, 2004, 2006).  
Evidence from cross-country studies is mixed: fiscal federalism in many countries often is 
found to be inefficient (Fornasari, Webb, and Zou. 1999; Rodden, 2002; Rodden and Rose-
Ackerman, 1997). Furthermore, arguments have been made and evidence has been found to 
show that Chinese fiscal decentralization is neither self-enforcing nor market-preserving (Wong, 
1991; Cai and Triesman, 2006; Tsui and Wang, 2004).  
However, this kind of debate could be misleading if one ignores the fundamental difference 
between the Chinese RDA regime and a federal state. In the Tiebout branch of fiscal federalism 
theory the economic gains to sub-national officials from attracting additional residents is central 
(Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1999), voice or exit. In a more general version of fiscal federalism sub-
national government officials are elected, and they are accountable to their constituencies (Epple 
and Zelenitz, 1981). In contrast Chinese officials face no pressure due to voice, exit or election, 
suggesting they should perform poorly. Yet, they face strong incentives to meet the promotion 
criteria defined by higher officials. Under certain conditions these promotion incentives could be 
strong enough to replace the incentives derived from voice, exit or election. But this is not 
always the case as some later sections will discuss.  
Moreover, the condition of market-preserving fiscal federalism requires that “[t]he allocation 
of authority and responsibility has an institutionalized degree of durability so that it cannot be 
altered by the national government.” 40 This requirement “provides for credible commitment to 
the federal system and thus for limits on the national government's discretionary authority. Not 
only must there be decentralization, but that decentralization must not be under the discretionary 
control of the national government.” This is “a necessary component of federalism's market-
preserving qualities” (MQW, 1995). However, under the Chinese constitution and in line with 
general Chinese government policies - both de jure and de facto - the central government 
preserves its discretionary power over regions, and this power has been exercised during the 
reform era (the PRC Constitution, 1982, 2004; Mertha, 2005). A prominent example in which 
this basic condition of market-preserving fiscal federalism is violated is the recentralization of 
tax collection power after more than a decade of fiscal decentralization. Facing a decline on the 
central government’s fiscal revenue while the economy was growing rapidly (Wong, 1991), in 
1994 a reversal of the fiscal decentralization took place in central government’s attempts to 
overcome this problem (Tsui and Wang, 2004). As a result, the share of sub-national 
governments’ tax revenue in national tax revenue was reduced substantially from 70% to 40% 
(World Bank, 2002). This implies there is no commitment to limiting the central authority’s 
power in fiscal policy. 
                                                        
40 Tsai (2004) argues that China violates basic assumptions of market-preserving federalism. 
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In addition to the nature of the basic institution, there is an important technical assumption 
necessary for Tiebout competition to work: factor mobility. Similarly, one of the five 
fundamental conditions of market-preserving fiscal federalism requires that “[t]he national 
government has the authority to police the common market and to ensure the mobility of goods 
and factors across sub-government jurisdictions” (MQW, 1995). However, when reforms started 
regions competed fiercely without factor mobility, and factors gradually became more mobile as 
a result of the reform - not as a starting point of the reform. For example, labor in China has only 
become partially mobile since the mid 1990s (Whalley and Zhang, 2004). Moreover, capital is 
even more immobile than labor, and segmentation of capital markets is still a problem today 
(Gordon and Li, 2003). Although the direction of the trend of trade barriers across regions and 
the direction of the trend of factor mobility are debatable subjects, the existence of severe factor 
immobility and regional trade barriers in China is indisputable (Young, 2000; Naughton, 2003; 
Bai et al., 2004). 
Within the theoretical framework of fiscal federalism, a violation of factor mobility makes 
inter-jurisdictional competition among regions impossible. Without factor mobility, citizens 
would not be able to “vote with their feet”, and thus there would be no Tiebout competition. 
Similarly, in the framework of market-preserving fiscal federalism, inter-jurisdictional 
competition would fail to serve as an important incentive device without a national common 
market and factor mobility (JQW, 2005). However, economic development and the development 
of a national common market could be characterized as something of a chicken-or-egg dilemma. 
Therefore, a recipe for economic development conditional on the existence of a common market 
or factor mobility would be difficult to apply usefully to real-world situations.41  
What happened during the Chinese reforms is that when factors were highly immobile, i.e. 
when Tiebout conditions were violated, Chinese regions started to compete fiercely with each 
other. Moreover, not only did the RDA regime manage regional competition in a growth-
enhancing manner, but also allowed factors gradually to become more mobile, thus encouraging 
the evolution of a national common market. The key point here is that factors became more 
mobile as an outcome of the reforms, rather than as a precondition for them.  
Finally, it is important to note that fiscal federalism theory is based on the very feature of 
market economies which requires that the economic roles of local governments be restricted to 
fiscal policies. Thus, the key issues of fiscal federalism theory revolve around fiscal policies such 
as taxation and the provision of public goods by local governments. However, Chinese sub-
national governments are responsible for much broader roles in the economy, of which fiscal 
policies are only a subset. Therefore, applying fiscal federalism models which focus on fiscal 
policy alone will miss large parts of the reforms and will not be able to explain China's economic 
reform and growth. This point is also valid for most transition economies, at least during the 
process of transforming the economy into a market economy.  
 
4. Regional Institutional Experiments 
 
 Regional experimentation is an essential part of the central decision-making process in 
China (Section 2.2.1). Starting from 1978, almost every major step on the path of reform was 
tried out by a few regions first before being launched nationwide. This is well echoed by the 
                                                        
41 In almost all developing economies, factor mobility is limited and a national common market has yet to be 




well-known “slogan” of the Chinese reforms: “crossing a river by touching the stones.” To some 
extent, the “stones” are reform measures and these “stones” are “touched” through regional 
experiments.  
 Sub-national governments play a critical role in attempting reforms due to the uncertainty 
of new reforms. One of the major uncertainties is related to the challenges of political resistance, 
because reforms create winners and losers in changing institutions. The political economy of 
institutional changes affects paths and strategies of reforms. Under certain conditions, regional 
reform experiments are used as a strategy to weaken political resistance and to reduce the 
uncertainties that come from a new reform. A successful experiment outcome not only provides 
information on which reform program works, but also can be used to support the reform and to 
persuade the unconvinced. Moreover, compared with a nationwide full-scale reform, when a 
regional experiment fails the drawbacks may be contained to the experimenting region. In 
addition, some compromise policies or compensation schemes aimed at opponents of a given 
policy may be attempted as a way to ease the opposition towards starting a reform. That is, the 
option value carried with regional experimentation may bear weight to tip the political balance in 
favour of those reforms which may otherwise have been discarded.  
 However, it seems that China is unique in deploying regional experimentation as a reform 
strategy, while it is usually agreed that Eastern Europe and the former USSR followed the "big 
bang" strategy. Moreover, this difference of approach is usually regarded as an explanation of 
why China’s reforms performed so differently than those of Eastern Europe (McMillan and 
Naughton, 1992; Sachs and Woo, 1997). Yet, the experimental approach was in fact utilized in 
the pre-1989 reforms in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, but failed miserably.42 Those 
failures led to a discrediting of the experimental approach in reforms and to the adoption of the 
big bang approach. Ironically, to a large extent, China followed many of Eastern European-style 
gradual reforms with experiment as an essential ingredient in the earlier stages of its reforms. A 
fundamental question is: what are the conditions that make China special in deploying regional 
experiments successfully? And, what makes the experimental approach work in China but not in 
Eastern Europe?  
 The key potential benefit of experimenting is to reduce the uncertainties of reforms. 
However, this potential benefit will be realized only when results can be obtained through 
experiments which do not disturb the rest of the economy, particularly in case of experiment 
failures. It turns out that how an experiment is coordinated determines whether an experimental 
approach will be fruitful, and in turn, the way experiments are coordinated is determined by the 
way the economy and the government is organized.  
 Conventional economic wisdom may lead people to wonder why a market should not be 
used to coordinate a reform experiment. However, it has been argued that essential coordination 
tasks have to be carried out through non-market mechanisms, even in developed market 
economies (Coase, 1937; Weitzman, 1972; Williamson, 1975). For economies carrying out 
reforms aimed at transforming a centrally-planned economy into a market economy, this is 
particularly true since markets there have yet to be developed. In his Nobel Lecture, Coase (1992) 
                                                        
42 An interesting example is Khrushchev’s “Sovnarkhoz” reform (decentralization reform) launched in 1957 and 
1958 through a trial-and-error process, which eventually established 105 “Sovnarkhozes” in the territory of the 
USSR (Swearer, 1961). The reform delegates full authorities to regional party secretaries over appointing SOE 
directors in their jurisdictions (Ballis, 1961). Regional leaders were encouraged to try reform measures and strong 
incentives are linked to their performance (Swearer, 1962). But this “Sovnarkhoz” reform failed due to serious 
cross-region coordination failures (Gregory and Stuart, 1998), which leads to the removal of Khrushchev in 1964. 
Markevich and Zhuravskaya (2009) document this failed reform. 
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argued that the function of management in a firm “was to co-ordinate” beyond the markets. He 
asked: “Why was it needed if the pricing system provided all the co-ordination necessary?” His 
answer was that “[t]o have an efficient economic system it is necessary not only to have markets 
but also areas of planning within organizations of the appropriate size.” When an organization is 
large, such as a multi-national company or a national government, a related key issue is “the 
appropriate size” of the sub-organization which coordinates, or who should coordinate what 
within an organization. In the spirit of Coase, to some extent different ways of allocating 
authorities within a government, or different ways of decentralization, is an institutional design 
issue which addresses the question: what is the boundary of different levels of government?  
 In reality, the success or failure of coordinating reform experiments is deeply entangled 
with the political economy of reforms. To make the analysis tractable, in the following 
subsection I simplify important political economy issues into a reduced form as parameters of a 
model. This allows me to focus on analysing coordination problems. Then, in subsection 4.2, I 
bring political economy issues back to real cases of regional experimentation.  
 
4.1 The Institutional Foundation for Regional Experiments  
 Appropriately devised and implemented reform experiments may reduce uncertainties 
substantially. However, a reform experiment often involves several complementary sub-
programs, so a reform experiment will fail if its related sub-programs are not coordinated 
satisfactorily.43 The role of the government, particularly local governments, in initiating and 
coordinating local experiments is particularly vital in cases where many markets are missing or 
ill-functioning.  
 There are many reasons why it is important to let local governments initiate and 
coordinate local experiments. These are best seen by exploring an alternative approach, which 
would be to let the central government initiate and coordinate reforms. “Local knowledge” and 
“local information” (Hayek) are the basic reasons why decentralized experimentation is superior 
to centralized experimentation. The central government does not know every thing; without 
information on local preferences, local technology and local institutional conditions, it is hard for 
a centralized regime to come up with a concrete, implementable idea which satisfies local 
demand (preferences). Moreover, implementing a reform requires detailed local knowledge. As a 
matter of fact, in China’s 30 years of reform, most reform ideas did not come from the central 
government. 
 A closely related disadvantage of centralized experimentation is the incentive problem. 
Without autonomous power, unmotivated local officials would be passive at the best and would 
not take initiatives to observe and to resolve potential problems. Delegating the power to conduct 
reform experiments to local governments converts local officials into entrepreneurs. A major 
feature of China’s economic reforms is that local officials make efforts to find market niches, 
initiate inventive ideas, try new approaches, etc. Without this widespread entrepreneurship and 
their institutional innovations, most of China’s successful reforms would not have been 
attempted.   
 However, not all governance structures are conducive to regional reform experiments. A 
challenging question to be addressed here is the institutional foundation for coordinating regional 
experiments. As discussed previously, a typical Chinese region is relatively self-contained and a 
sub-national government is responsible for most economic activities within its jurisdiction. That 
                                                        
43 Here, the central importance of complementarity among different reform dimensions is in odds with the simplistic 
view that a single factor determines economic development.  
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is, sub-national governments are assigned with the power and the resources to initiate and to 
coordinate regional reform experiments. Moreover, given that interregional dependence is 
relatively weak in China, when a regional experiment fails, its impact on the rest of the national 
economy is minimal (Qian and Xu, 1993).44  
 QRX (2006; also 1999, 2007) developed a theory to explain how the Chinese RDA 
regime creates conditions that alleviate coordination problems in reforms and that allows for 
flexible experimentation.45  In this theory a reform program is consisted of some complementary 
sub-programs. Each sub-program of the reform is characterized by its own individual attributes, 
and these complementary sub-programs must ultimately be fit together in order to be integrated 
properly. A reform is completed successfully only if the characteristics of each attribute of the 
various sub-programs are matched successfully. A failure in the matching of attributes implies a 
breakdown of economic order, i.e. a drastic failure. To simplify the matter, suppose a reform 
program is ex ante well designed in the sense that all the attributes are matched by those in the 
blueprint of the program. However, some of the attributes may not suit local conditions ex post, 
and adjusting these attributes may lead to mismatches with the attributes of other tasks, which 
will then require further adjustments.  
To illustrate the basic idea, let us look at the following example. Suppose a reform has two 
sub-programs: an enterprise restructuring program (involving a lay-off of excess workers) and 
the creation of a social safety net (involving unemployment benefits). The attributes of the 
enterprise restructuring program include the number of laid-off workers and their individual 
characteristics, such as: age, seniority, family composition, length of residence, sex, type of 
contract, current wage, history of employment, etc. The attributes of the unemployment benefits 
in the social safety net include the rules of eligibility, such as: length of employment, special 
circumstances (i.e. veterans)), the status of enterprises, the rules of the benefits such as size and 
length, the types of benefits (monetary or not), the technical support of computers, administration, 
budget, etc. If some attributes of the two tasks are not matched, many laid-off workers may not 
be compensated appropriately, so they may strike and the ensuing social disorder will make the 
reform a failure.  
Therefore, a successful reform requires both a good reform blueprint and proper 
implementation (i.e. coordination). The uncertainty of the quality of a reform program can be 
reduced to form an expression of two factors: a) the political support for, or resistance to, a 
reform; b) the technical quality of the proposed reform. A program with many political 
challenges is more uncertain, and a reform program that incites strong political opposition will 
fail in spite of how “good” the program looks from an outsider’s perspective. Therefore, a 
program without political support will be regarded as bad regardless how good the program is in 
theory or in practice in another country. In addition, a program can be technically uncertain. For 
example, a mechanical transplantation of the case law from the US to China would be highly 
technically uncertain given the linguistic, historical and cultural differences between the two 
countries. In a simplified theory, a bad reform program always leads to a failure, however well 
coordinated in the implementation. Yet, without a test it is not known for sure ex ante whether a 
reform program is good or not.  
                                                        
44 Provincial officials of Anhui and Guangdong argued that a failed experiment in an isolated locality would not 
affect the province’s performance when they initiated regional experiments related to land reform and special zone 
reform in the late 1970s (for more details see Section 4.2).  
45  In the QRX papers Chinese economy is modelled as M-form organization. All the political economy 
interpretations associated with the RDA regime discussed here may or may not be shared by my co-authors. 
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On the other hand, a good reform program needs to be implemented or coordinated correctly. 
The quality of coordination depends on the quality of the information available to decision-
makers in the organization. Regional officials enjoy a local information advantage (a la Hayek, 
1947), in that they have first-hand observations on the site; whereas for others, any on-site 
information would require communication, which is subject to imperfect transmission. The QRX 
framework assumes that information transmission is imperfect. To capturing the reality fully, this 
assumption should be interpreted as a reduced-form expression of two noises: a) political noise; 
and b) technical noise. Political noise occurs when information is transmitted through political 
skeptics or opponents, while technical noise arises from the fact that two officials can have 
different knowledge and different interpretations of the same message, or for some other 
technical reasons.  
In China’s RDA regime, where each region is self-contained and regional officials are 
assigned the power to coordinate, reform experiments can be coordinated locally. Relying on 
first-hand local knowledge directly, without involving upper-level officials, local coordination 
will not be subject to political interference and technical noises, and will be easier to 
accommodate. Most importantly, flexibility in reform experiments makes it possible to try a 
reform in one region (or a few regions) first and extend the experiment to other regions later if 
the first experiment is a success. In the case of a failure, although the failed experimenting 
region’s payoff will be reduced, the payoff for the non-experimenting regions will remain 
constant. This flexibility weakens resistance to reform proposals and encourages attempts of 
many different reforms, which may otherwise not be tried at all. 
In contrast, in an economy where specialized ministries are responsible for implementing 
tasks, because ministries are complementary, reform experiments have to be coordinated by the 
central officials. This makes both political and technical noise inevitable, thereby making 
coordination failure more likely. One of the worst features of this economy is its rigidity, which 
prevents a regional experiment or a small-scale experiment from being beneficial. A fundamental 
institutional problem here is that because complementary tasks are grouped separately into 
specialized ministries, and therefore coordination across ministries must be provided by the 
centre. In coordinating a small-scale experiment, the central government has to carry it out in 
multiple steps involving all relevant ministries. These complications in coordinating regional 
experiments not only incur deadweight losses (as shown rigorously in QRX), but also makes it 
easy to sabotage an experiment in the process.  
In general, when there are more political suspicions surrounding a reform program, and 
when political opposition within the government is stronger, therefore causing coordination 
failure to occur more often, the advantage of the RDA regime becomes more apparent. These 
points are illustrated by case studies in the following subsection.  
 
4.2 Regional Experiments on Land Reform and Special Economic Zones (SEZs) 
 China’s land reform and SEZ reform were both made possible by the efforts of reform-
oriented sub-national governments facing stiff political resistance at national level. Successful 
regional reform experiment outcomes created bases for forging consensus among the central 
leaders, which made large-scale diffusion of the reform programs possible at a later date. Ex ante 
the reduced uncertainties of regional experiments gave reformers better chances to try 
controversial programs. Ex post successful experiment outcomes - even those that were only 
partially successful - could be used as evidence to convince undecided politicians and to 
accumulate momentum and political support for the reforms.  
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Chinese land reform started in the late 1970s, and is officially known as the household 
responsibility system (HRS). It is regarded as “a major social experiment in the design of 
institutions in which a system emphasizing social values has been replaced by a system relying 
on economic incentives” (McMillan et al., 1989). During the period of the HRS reform between 
1978 and 1984, output in the Chinese agricultural sector increased by over 61 percent. Seventy-
eight percent of the increase in productivity in Chinese agriculture in this period of time was due 
to the changes brought about by the HRS reform (McMillan et al., 1989). By examining many 
other factors, Lin (1992) disentangled the contribution to output growth of the HRS reform from 
those of other reforms, as well as from that of increased input availability. He confirms that the 
dominant source of agriculture output growth during 1978-1984 was the change from the 
production-team system to HRS, which was directly responsible for 49 percent of the output 
growth. Moreover, the change in crop patterns, from grain to non-grain crops, also had a positive 
impact.  
Although it may be a bit of an exaggeration to call the introduction of the HRS “the design 
of institutions,” it is pretty accurate to regard this process as “a major social experiment.” A key 
point I want to highlight here is that this major social experiment was initiated and carried out by 
sub-national governments without an design at the national level; this is the way to overcome the 
political resistances and risks associated with land reform.  
Similar to what happened in Central-Eastern Europe before the 1989 reforms, or in the 
former Soviet Union during perestroika, political/ideological resistance to land reform were 
strong in China. Any change which could lead to de-collectivization was seriously challenged, 
and any failure associated with land reform would be utilized by the conservatives for political 
reasons. Thus, minimizing the political and technical uncertainties of land reform was critically 
important for the survival of the reform, as well as the reformers themselves.  
In the late 1970s, “proto-types” of the HRS were tried by a handful of local officials in a few 
provinces such as Anhui, Sichuan and Guangdong. One of the best known examples of initiative 
by local government was in Xiaogang village, in Fengyang county of Anhui. In those localities, 
land and output quotas were contracted out from local governments (Communes) to individual 
households. The experiments were carried out under high risks, given that people who were 
involved in the 1960s’ land reform were heavily penalized not long ago.46 At that time, land 
reform was unconstitutional (as stated in the 1978 Constitution of China), and was officially 
banned by the Communiqué of the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP, 
which is often quoted officially and in the literature as the first milestone of the post-Mao reform 
(Kelliher, 1992; Naughton, 1995). The State Council and the Party’s news paper, the People’s 
Daily, issued decrees and commentaries on behalf of the central government to stop any land 
reform attempts with political threats based on the ban of the Communiqué (Wu, 2009). Deng 
Xiaoping was quiet until some obvious successful experiment results came out.  
 Facing the daunting challenges of carrying out the land reform, in 1979 Zhao Ziyang and 
Wan Li, then the governors of Sichuan and Anhui respectively, decided to experiment with 
different land contracting schemes in a few counties within their jurisdictions. According to Tian 
Jiyun, a Vice-Premier of the State Council between 1983 and 1993, Dangtu county was one of 
the counties picked up by Wan in 1979 and about seventeen percent of rural households there 
participated in the land contracting experiment. 47  All of the land reform experiments were 
                                                        
46 Land reform was tried in many Chinese regions during the early 1960s but reforms were banned, and officials and 
peasants involved in the experiments were punished severely during the CR. 
47 Similar experiments were also carried out in Guangdong in 1978 under the leadership of governor Xi Zhongxun at 
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coordinated locally.  
 In 1980, validated by the successful regional experiment results, Wan and Zhao reported 
to the central government and rallied for expanding reform experiments into more regions 
throughout the nation. Supported by their successful experiment results, in late 1980 the central 
government decided to allow for regional land reform experiments spread-out nationwide. Zhao 
and Wan were promoted to be the Premier and Vice-Premier of the State Council, respectively, 
in order to carry out the nationwide reform experiments (Tian, 2008). After this, the nationwide 
land reform experiment propagated quickly, so that in 1981 about 45% of rural households 
participated in the reform. Subsequently participation increased to 80% in the next year, and 
finally, reached 99% in 1984 (Lin, 1992). Thereafter, agricultural reforms in general and land 
reform in particular were further progressed and were consolidated through numerous further 
reform measures. Similarly, most of those are based on successful regional experiment results.48 
 In sharp contrast, at the onset of Chinese reforms, all Soviet farming tasks were 
coordinated by the central government through specialized ministries (e.g., Ministries of 
Agriculture, Trade, Cereal and Grain Production, Tractors and Farm Machinery, Food Industry, 
Rural Construction, Fertilizer, Land Reclamation and Water Resources, and Fruit and Vegetable 
Farming etc.). The tasks of providing inputs to the farmers, of managing their operations, storage, 
processing, transport, and road infrastructure were all allocated to separate agencies over which 
neither collective farms nor regional governments had any control, and thus it would have been 
extremely difficult to experiment without support from all relevant ministries. In 1989 
Gorbachev launched his comprehensive agriculture reform in a manner such that all relevant 
ministries were included. In the reform, peasants could lease land with long-term contracts. 
Although the goal seems similar to the Chinese reform, the farmers encountered grave 
coordination problems. As a result, there were serious problems in implementation, such as waste 
during the storage, transport and processing stages due to failures in coordination between 
production units, transport and storage (Wädekin, 1992). 
 Another famous Chinese reform is the special economic zone (SEZ) development and the 
subsequent meteoric rise in foreign direct investment (FDI). Thanks to this reform, even though 
China started with virtually zero FDI and almost negligible trade and foreign reserves in 1978, in 
a quarter of a century China has become one of the largest FDI recipient countries in the world, 
with the world’s largest foreign reserves, and also one of the largest trading countries in the 
world. It is clearly shown in the following Table 4 that FDI in China and Chinese exports are 
essentially driven by the SEZs. When China first opened up and began attracting FDI and trade, 
37% of FDI was located in SEZs in 1985, and 89% of the national exports came from the SEZs 
in 1985. In 2005, when China became the largest FDI recipient country in the world, 93% of FDI 
was located in SEZs, and 93% of China’s exports came from the SEZs. It is not an exaggeration 
to claim that it is the SEZ that made China the country with the largest foreign reserves in the 
world, as well as the country with the largest trade surplus with the US and the EU. Therefore, 
among all the Chinese reform measures, the SEZ has had the greatest direct impact on the global 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
that time but were stopped due to political pressure from the conservatives in the central government (Cai et al., 
2008). 
48 Although rural households enjoy the residual income and residual control rights over what they do with the land, 
under the HRS the control rights of allocation and management of land resources are kept with the local officials. 
Thus, most cultivated land in rural China remains partially collectively owned. Jacoby, Li and Rozelle (2002) show 
the existence of inefficiencies caused by this partial privatization. However, they also show that the inefficiency 









Nat’l Exports SEZ Exports SEZ share of 
Exports 
Nat’l FDI SEZ FDI SEZ share 
of FDI (mil US$) (mil US$) (mil US$) (mil US$) 
1980 4 18119 278 1.5% 145 51 34.9% 
1985 77 27350 24327 89.0% 1956 728 37.2% 
1990 290 62091 44602 71.8% 3487 2551 73.2% 
1995 341 148780 124692 83.8% 37521 33694 89.8% 
2000 341 249203 228779 91.8% 40715 38796 95.3% 
2005 342 761953 709373 93.1% 60325 56397 93.5% 
Sources: China statistical yearbooks 1986-2006; China Urban Statistical yearbook 1986-2006; China Urban Forty years;  
Provincial Statistical yearbooks 1996-2006; State Council documents. 
  
Although by conventional wisdom it seems obvious to suggest SEZ reform policies in order 
to improve trade and attract FDI, initiating and carrying out these reforms was a great challenge 
at the beginning of the reform era. There was strong political opposition to the idea of renting 
land to foreign firms or multi-national firms, as these kinds of practices were regarded as ‘selling 
the nation’. Indeed this kind of reform was unconstitutional at that time. The political risk would 
be too high for a reformer to bear if one had to confront the convention of the planning apparatus 
at a national level or to confront the constitution head-to-head. Thus, those concerned with how 
to attract FDI to China faced tremendous political and economical difficulties and uncertainties. 
Moreover, when the constitution (including the Party’s constitution) did not protect private 
property rights, how would one convince foreign investors to invest? When imports/exports were 
all controlled by government agents - national and regional - how could China accommodate 
foreign and domestic firms to develop trade-intensive businesses?  
Facing these tough constraints, the central leadership was, at best, not able to build a 
consensus to move forward (Cai et al., 2008; Zhao, 2009). The idea of setting up SEZs to attract 
FDI and to develop export-oriented industries was initiated and experimented by sub-national 
governments. The strategy of regional experimentation played a vital role in dealing with the 
ensuing difficulties and uncertainties. According to the archives (Cai et al., 2008), the idea of 
conducting municipal experiments to attract FDI was proposed by officials of Guangdong 
province in 1979. The proposal suggested to authorize Shenzhen and Zhuhai as experimenting 
municipalities, and required that conditional on the success of the first experiment other cities 
will follow similar experiments in the next step. A major part of the experiment involved trying 
new sets of institutions, legislation and rules for the purpose of attracting FDI, and furthermore 
municipality governments were made responsible for implementation. Moreover, the proposal 
asked for greater regional autonomy, particularly for decision-making power in regional 
experiments.  
The skepticism towards the SEZs was strong at the top level of the central government 
(Zeng, 1984). There had been fierce debates in the central government and within the party 
apparatus on the desirability and the nature of SEZs, and on the paths of development the SEZs 
should take. 49  As a compromise, approval was given by the State Council for small-scale 
                                                        
49 Chen Yun, a top leader of the CCP, cast deep doubts on the SEZs. The idea of setting up the SEZs was regarded as 
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experiments in four remote cities in 1979 (The Central Government Circular No.50, 1979, 
Zhongfa (1979) 50).  
Together with authorizing the experiments for SEZs, the central government also granted the 
Guangdong government, and particularly the experimenting municipal governments, more 
autonomy in regional planning, in enterprise management and in policies related to FDI. In 
August 1980 the People’s Congress approved the State Council’s proposal of setting up four 
SEZs in Guangdong and Fujian and passed the first legal rule on the SEZs: “the Regulation for 
Guangdong SEZs.” This was the first kind of regional law tested, which was drafted with the 
help of legal experts sent from the central government (Cai et al., 2008). When the experiment 
was expanded into other provinces, they also adopted and modified this law accordingly.  
 Supported by the initial achievements of the first group of SEZs in 1984, the central 
government endorsed another 14 cities to experiment with SEZs, and the experiment was further 
expanded to more cities in 1985. In the early 1990s, the extremely fast growth of export and FDI 
validated the success of the SEZs. The opposition to the SEZs is subdued and encouraging SEZ 
development becomes a national policy. In 1992, SEZs comprised all the capital cities of inland 
provinces and autonomous regions, 15 free trade zones, 32 state-level economic and 
technological development zones, and 53 new- and high-tech industrial development zones. 
Currently, SEZs encompass more than 100 national economic and technological development 
zones, 15 national bonded areas and 14 border trade and co-operation regions in the broadest 
sense.  
One of the major features of the small scale regional experiments, such as the HRS and SEZ 
reforms, is that for a certain period of time the non-experimenting regions remain unchanged 
until diffusion commences. The co-existence of two systems, experimenting vs. non-
experimenting or reforming vs. non-reforming, in the reform process is sometimes called “the 
dual track system.” The dual track system has been used to describe both small scale and full 
scale reform experiments in which all regions implement a reform experiment at the same time, 
while keeping the non-experimenting system for a certain period of time. A major example of a 
full scale experiment is the dual track price system. The most important benefit of the dual track 
system is to reduce resistance to a reform by substantially reducing the number of losers through 
keeping the non-reforming system at earlier stages of the reform (Lau, Qian and Roland, 2000). 
However, there are essential conditions to be satisfied to make the dual track approach beneficial 
in reforms. If the state is weak in enforcement and as a result parties are able to siphon resources 
away from low-priced existing transactions to high-priced new transactions, the dual track 
approach may fail to function (Che and Facchini, 2007). Thus, the sub-national governments’ 
enforcement capability to regulate firms’ strategies is vital in order for the dual approach to be 
efficiency-improving.  
 In addition to locally initiated reform experiments, almost all important reforms 
sponsored by the central government in the past three decades were also tried and implemented 
through regional experiments, such as the state sector reforms (Heilmann, 2008). The bankruptcy 
reform in the mid 1990s illustrates this phenomenon. Although there was collective support from 
the top leaders for restructuring the state sector drastically through enforcing the bankruptcy law, 
there was no consensus on how to do it. After it issued general guidelines on the basic priorities 
and general approaches in 1994, the central government encouraged local governments to 
experiment with innovative solutions for debt restructuring, mergers, closures, and employee 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
equivalent to a "rented territory" or "the selling of the nation," which would be a revival of the semi-colonial era. 
The other objection charged that the SEZs would exacerbate inequalities (Zhao, 2009). 
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resettlement. Eighteen municipalities were picked up by the central government “to test new 
methods for dealing with the resettlement of employees in insolvent industrial enterprises.” Each 
experimenting municipality was responsible for coordinating all the relevant aspects within its 
jurisdiction, such as land-use rights and using the proceeds for resettling the laid-off workers etc. 
(Heilmann, 2008). This reform finished in the mid 2000s. 
 
4.3 Incentives of Experimenting  
Regional experimentation is a major strategy for moving a reform forward before central 
decision-makers are able to build consensus for the reform. Experimenting involves high risks 
for regional officials who conduct the experiments, and it also creates large positive externalities 
at the costs of experimenting regions. Moreover, conducting reform experiments often requires 
officials take initiatives and make extra efforts to deal with unexpected contingencies. Without 
the initiative to solve problems, experiments would easily fail. Therefore, in addition to 
previously discussed conditions, setting up proper incentives is essential for inducing sub-
national officials to conduct experiments.50  
It is relatively straightforward to design incentives for central government-sponsored local 
experiments. Often, the central government provides generous compensation to experimenting 
local governments (Heilmann, 2008). However, for locally-initiated experiments, the incentive 
mechanism is subtler. It turns out that the regional competition-based promotion system is one of 
the mechanisms that create motivations for regions to be entrepreneurial in experimenting. In the 
RDA regime, regional officials are appointed, and initiating or implementing successful regional 
experiments can lead to substantial promotions. Thus, although experimenting involves risks and 
externalities, experimenting also creates chances not only to outperform others, but also more 
importantly, to lead others, which implies getting unusual promotion opportunities. That is, the 
benefits associated with promotions will correct disincentives from positive externalities.  
In addition to the costs of experiments, another critically important issue is who decides 
what to experiment and who conducts the experiment. By being granted a broad range of control 
rights over regional economic affairs, the regionally decentralized structure converts many 
regional bureaucrats into entrepreneurial officials. Regional officials are active in identifying 
reform experiment opportunities. If, after someone’s initiative, other regions follow an 
experiment, it implies that this reform experiment was a success, and therefore the chance of 
getting a substantial promotion is higher. Perceiving this, officials with greater career ambitions 
would initiate reform experiments on their own, sometimes even taking high risks. That is, the 
centralized personnel control may internalize some of the externality problems of regional 
experiments. The HRS and SEZ experiments discussed in the previous subsection are the most 
visible examples of this process. In those examples, the pioneers of the HRS and SEZ reforms 
were promoted substantially when the experiments were recognized by the central government as 
models for the nation to follow.  
Moreover, it is observed that a common practice in reform era is to promote officials from 
more developed municipalities, where many reform experiments were tried out earlier, to leading 
provincial posts, particularly in less developed regions. Chien and Zhao (2007) document that 
from the late 1990s to the early 2000s there were three former heads of Suzhou city who were 
promoted to become governors of Jiangsu, Shaanxi and Jilin respectively; a former Shenzhen 
                                                        
50 In a Tiebout federal system, where officials are elected from their constituencies, the value dilution due to the 




mayor was appointed as the governor of Hunan, and a mayor of Wenzhou became the governor 
of Sichuan. These three cities pioneered many reform experiments on their own and are among 
the best reforming municipalities in China.  
By using a panel data consisting of thirty provincial regions between 1978 and 2005, 
through a diff-in-diff approach to control for groups with and without transfer of governors and 
before and after transfer of governors, Xu et al. (2007) found that, everything else being equal, 
cross-regional governor transfer increased regional GDP growth rate by 1%. In the more recent 
period of 1992 to 2005, the effect was enlarged to 2%. By constructing a panel data consisting of 
thirty provincial regions between 1978 and 2004, with a similar approach, Zhang and Gao (2007) 
find that the effect of cross regional governor transfer on regional GDP growth rate was 
significant for the period of 1990 to 2004.  
 
5. Regional Competition and Regional Experiments in Some Major Reforms 
 
 This section discusses some major economic reforms which have had substantial impacts 
on China’s economic growth over the past three decades. This discussion serves two purposes: 
first, it is important to understand the mechanisms by which these reforms operate for their own 
sake; and in addition, these reforms act as concrete examples of the conceptual discussions above 
about the mechanisms of regional competition and regional experimentation.  
 
5.1 The Township-Village Enterprises (TVEs) and the Non-State Sector 
Large-scale entry and fast development of the non-state sector is a distinctive feature of 
China’s reforms.51 The pace of growth of the non-state sector is so quick that the state sector is 
unable to compete. Without a conventional form of privatization of the state sector, i.e. 
privatizing existing SOEs, the market share of China’s state sector in the national economy 
shrunk from 78% in 1978 to 53% in 1991. The most important non-state sector until the mid-
1990s was the TVE. By the early 1990s, TVEs accounted for about 4/5 of the output of the non-
state sector. Between 1981 and 1990, the total industrial output of TVEs grew at an average 
annual rate of 28.1%, while the rate for the state sector was 7.7%. As a comparison, China's 
average annual GDP growth rate was 8.7% between 1979 and 1991. Moreover, TVEs had 
substantially higher TFP growth rates than the state sector in those years (Xu, 1995).  
More importantly, the TVE actually served as a major stepping-stone in changing China’s 
institutions. A typical TVE is a collectively-owned enterprise located in a township/village. All 
the people in the township/village which "sets up" the TVE own the firm collectively. The 
community government of the township/village "represents" the communal collective owners, 
and is the de facto executive owner of the TVE (Byrd and Lin, 1990). The property rights of the 
TVE are vaguely defined. From a viewpoint based on ‘conventional wisdom’, the governance of 
these firms appears deficient and should result in unproductive firms. Therefore, the spectacular 
performance of the TVE sector poses major challenges to economics (Weitzman and Xu, 1994). 
This is particularly true before the mid-1990s.  
Several complementary explanations are proposed in the literature, and most focus on the 
role of the community government. The strong incentives created by regional competition are 
one of the institutional reasons for the rapid development of TVEs. Moreover, the relatively self-
contained nature of regional economies gave TVEs opportunities to grow. There are broad 
                                                        
51 To some extent Hungary, Poland and Vietnam are the other transition economies that shared this feature and they 
all enjoyed better performances than other transition economies. 
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ranges of products which the TVEs can produce to meet local demand, and there are often 
sufficient local semi-products to supply to TVEs as inputs. Close links between TVEs and local 
SOEs often facilitated the transfer of technology and management know-how (Xu and Zhuang, 
1998).  
Concerning the relatively effective governance of the community government over TVEs, 
most conceptual discussions emphasize the second-best nature of TVEs when there is weak or no 
legal protection of private property rights (Chang and Wang, 1994; Li, 1996; Oi, 1999). That is 
because township-village governments had access to resources, whereas community citizens did 
not. Moreover, when the firm is owned by the community government, the community 
government faces less state expropriation because part of the revenue is used to finance the local 
provision of public goods, which addresses the state’s concerns and also enhances the firm’s 
future earning potential (Che and Qian, 1998). These arguments are supported by empirical 
evidence collected from villages (Chen and Rozelle, 1999).   
Another major feature of the TVEs is the prevailing of the informal institutions, such as 
implicit contractual relationships between community governments and TVEs, between TVE 
employees, and between TVEs. Weitzman and Xu (1994) conjectured that local cultural or social 
norms may be an important factor behind informal institutions. This conjecture shares the same 
spirit of the evolutionary repeated game theory of social norms (Axelrod, 1984; Fudenberg and 
Maskin, 2008) and is closely related to the literature on the evolution of social norms, culture and 
human behaviour. Empirically, it sheds light on substantial regional differences in TVE 
development, including powerful informal institutions in post-TVE developments (Xu and 
Zhang, 2009), which reflects the diverse history of China’s regional economic development.52  
As protection of private property rights improved (Clarke, Murrell and Whiting, 2006) and 
asset markets developed, many benefits of TVEs are diminished. Moreover, associated with 
large-scale migration since the mid 1990s, an increasing numbers of TVE employees, including 
TVE top managers, have become migrant workers. This also contributes to changes in the 
governance of TVEs.53 A large percentage of TVEs were privatized since the mid 1990s (Kung 
and Lin, 2007; Park and Shen, 2003; Li and Rozelle, 2004).  
Although TVEs have declined, the institutional legacy of TVEs in China’s economic 
development and corporate governance is extensive. Important mechanisms that prevailed in 
TVEs, e.g. the intimate involvement of community governments in business and informal 
institutional arrangements, are still at work today, and their impacts on the rise of 
entrepreneurship in China are far-reaching, such as on the fast growth of clusters of large number 
of small private firms in coastal provinces.   
With clustering of a vast number of small specialized firms, many Chinese townships have 
become national or world “factories” for certain products. It is these townships which made 
China “the world’s factory”.54 In a typical industrial cluster, thousands of highly specialized 
                                                        
52 Most TVE employees and managers lived in the same community for generations when there was almost no 
migration before the early 1990s. Under certain conditions, close long-term interactions among community members 
(virtually infinitely repeated overlapping-generation relationships) might foster a social norm within the community 
which may facilitate informal institutions. In contrast, SOEs are not organized based on natural communities, such 
as villages; therefore, many of the informal mechanisms found in TVEs would not function in SOEs. 
53 In the terminology of evolutionary game theory, there were lots of mutants which invaded the repeated games and 
that would change the equilibrium strategy of the game (Fudenberg and Maskin, 2008). 
54 For example, Datang township makes one-third of the world’s socks; 40% of the world’s neckties are made in 
Shengzhou township; more than 70% of the buttons for clothes made in China come from Qiaotou township; 
Songxia township produces 350 million umbrellas every year; and Puyuan township produced 60% of China’s 
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family owned entrepreneurial firms are worked together with infrastructural and regulatory 
support of township governments. The small firms in a cluster are closely coordinated, similar to 
workshops within an integrated firm, whereas they are also highly competitive, as in markets. 
These specialized small firms are linked together by networks of informal arrangements, such as 
implicit contracts, so that every final product is jointly produced by a collection of many firms. 
Repeated interactions among the workshops and among the agents help reduce the monitoring 
and enforcement costs. The township government affects the overall and long-run strategic 
direction of the cluster without direct involvement in the daily operations of the thousands of 
small workshops.55 To a large extent, some important features of TVE institutions, particularly 
the importance of entrepreneurial local governments to local business development, remain in 
this post-TVE development. The clusters are strategically managed by township governments, 
although they have no ownership of the assets of the workshops and are not involved in their 
financing, except for most of the land and some of the buildings. They provide infrastructure, 
secure property rights, regulate quality, train labourers, and provide favourable policies.  
All of these make the township government similar to the headquarters of a conglomerate. 
Moreover, to a large extent, due to the way that they coordinate with each other, the behaviour of 
those privately-owned specialized workshops are more like workshops within an integrated large 
firm than independent small firms in a market (Xu and Zhang, 2009).  
The evolution of TVEs and the subsequent clustering of modes of production are 
institutional responses created by entrepreneurs, including local entrepreneurial officials, to 
overcome constraints such as weak legal protections for property rights, weak contract 
enforcement, as well as credit and technical constraints, etc. When the political, legal, and 
economic conditions improve, a firm’s organization and organizational structure may change as 
well. Less viable forms of organizational structures are eliminated through competitive pressures 
in a decentralized setting, whereas it will be hard to prescribe the optimal path of firm evolution 
beforehand. This makes regional experiment-based decision-making important. Overall, the 
success of TVEs and post-TVE developments is due to the regional decentralization which 
allows for the full use of individual talents through introducing various institutional and 
organizational innovations to cope with constraining factors. 
 
 5.2 State Sector Reform: Centrally Sponsored Local Experiments 
Similar to other transition economies, at the onset of the reform the Chinese economy was 
dominated by the state sector, and therefore state sector reform was the most important. Yet, as 
opposed to other transition economies, most of the SOEs in China were “owned” by sub-national 
governments. China’s state sector reforms have been very much driven by regional competition 
and regional experiments. Two major aspects of early SOE reforms have been discussed in the 
literature. The first aspect concerns appointment or selection of SOE managers. Before 
privatization (to be discussed later), sub-national governments were responsible for selecting 
SOE managers within their jurisdictions. Under the pressure of regional competition and the 
importance of local SOEs to regional economies, sub-national officials became very 
performance-conscious when considering the appointment of SOE managers (Groves, Hong, 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
cashmere sweaters, of which China is the world’s largest producer (Xu and Zhang, 2009). 
55 Take Puyuan Township (Zhejiang province), the largest cashmere sweater production centre in the world, as an 
example. There were six thousand family-owned highly specialized workshops and three thousand private trading 
shops in the cluster coordinated strategically by the township government (Xu and Zhang, 2009). 
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McMillan, and Naughton, hereafter abbreviated as GHMN, 1995). The second aspect of the early 
reforms involved managerial incentives (GHMN, 1994; Zhuang and Xu, 1996).  
As regional SOEs were owned by regional governments, to a certain extent, a region’s state 
sector is like a state-run regional conglomerate in which sub-national governments functioned 
like the headquarters of regional conglomerates (Oi, 1999). This is particularly true for 
municipalities and counties. The regional governments, functioning like the personnel 
department of a regional conglomerate, selected managers, made decisions on promotions and 
demotions, maintained dossiers and tracked managerial records etc. In response to regional 
competition, also under the encouragement of the central government’s reform guidelines, sub-
national governments experimented with various “managerial responsibility systems” in which 
managers were delegated power to make many decisions, and employees were given financial 
incentives tied to enterprise performance.  
By using firm-level panel data, GHMN (1994, 1995) and Li (1997) evaluated the outcomes 
of some major SOE reform experiments in the 1980s. In their sample, over 80% of the managers 
were appointed by sub-national governments, and their careers were determined by the 
evaluations of their bureaucratic superiors; and the majority of SOEs were in the regional 
experiments of delegate more authorities to SOE managers, which allowed SOEs to keep a large 
proportion of their profits and to use the retained funds for worker bonuses, worker welfare 
facilities, and enterprise investment, etc. Moreover, performance responsibility contracts for SOE 
managers were experimented with in many regions. The contracts specified performance 
indicators, such as profit, reinvestment, and compensation structure. Most of the SOEs’ 
managers in the GHMN sample signed the contracts. GHMN (1994) investigated how SOE 
managers responded to their increased autonomy and how firm productivity was affected. They 
found that with more autonomy in output decisions and with higher marginal profit-retention 
rates, SOEs increased their use of bonuses and hired more fixed-term contract workers. 
Moreover, the strengthened incentives were positively correlated with higher productivity.  
Another important experimental SOE reform was the system of management selection by 
competitive auctions. About 14 percent of the managers in the GHMN sample were selected 
through competitive auction. The usage of this reform peaked in the late 1980s - 1987 and 1988 
accounted for 57.4% of the competitive auctions in the GHMN sample. Auction procedures 
varied among regional experiments. In general, a typical SOE was put up for auction by its 
superior municipal government. The most important part of a bid was the promise of profit to the 
municipal authority in the near future. In most cases, bidders also made promises to reinvest, etc. 
The municipal government as the owner of the SOE then chose the winning bidder on the basis 
of promised profit delivery and the management plan etc. The top manager often signed a 
management contract and frequently was required to put up a security deposit, which could be 
forfeited if the manager failed to meet the promised performance.  
Based on their firm level data, GHMN indicated that the managerial labor market was 
functioning in China’s state sector such that SOE managers changed jobs frequently. They found 
both demotion/promotion of the previous manager and the conditions of the new manager's 
appointment can be partially explained by the corresponding firm's performance. Moreover, they 
found that SOE managers' total compensation is positively related to firm profits. In their sample, 
overall, SOE per worker output rose 67% (in constant prices) for the decade of the 1980s. As a 
result, in that period of time TFP growth contributed to 73% of output growth; moreover, over 
87% of the TFP growth was attributable to improved incentives, intensified product market 
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competition, and improved factor allocation (Li, 1997), which is confirmed by researches based 
on national census data (Jefferson et al, 1996).  
Nevertheless, the early SOE reforms failed to solve some basic problems of the state sector. 
While productivity was increased, facing fierce competition from the non state sector and losing 
monopolistic position in most product markets, the financial performance of the state sector 
worsened rapidly. The total losses in the state sector kept worsening between 1993 and their peak 
in 1998, when the state sector made a net loss of 285 billion RMB (Table 4) and the government 
kept pumping financial aid into this sector for bailouts.56 The record-breaking losses of the state 
sector led to an unprecedented number of non-performing loans (NPLs) in China’s banking 
sector. These were manifestations of a serious soft budget constraint syndrome (SBC), a major 
moral hazard problem prevalent in all centralized economies and transition economies.57 The 
severe SBC problem and the well-known consequences of SBC created deep worries about the 
sustainability or even the survivability of the Chinese regime. The SBC syndrome is caused by 
the lack of a credible commitment from the government to allow loss-making SOEs to fail 
(Kornai, 1980, 1992; for surveys see Maskin and Xu, 2001; Kornai, Maskin and Roland, 2003).58 
The key to hardening a budget constraint is to make bankruptcy threats to SOEs credible.  
To a large extent, since the late-1990s, the state sector bankruptcy reforms and privatization 
(to be discussed in Section 5.3), have hardened budget constraints, which turned the state sector 
to profitable since the year 2000 (Table 5). The effectiveness of these reforms constitutes a big 
surprise for many experts.59 Indeed, as it is for other transition economies, hardening budget 
constraints and bankruptcy reform were some of the most difficult reforms in China. Given the 
close interrelation between SOE debt and the state banking system, and between SOEs and social 
safety nets, radical bankruptcy reform or SOE restructuring could lead to massive social unrest 
and bankruptcy of state banks (Booth, 2004; Heilmann, 2008). Moreover, state firms carry many 
types of policy burdens, such as employment and social security etc. (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; 
                                                        
56 GHMN (1994, 1995) reported no evidence that budget constraints for state-owned firms were hardened in the 
1980s. In studying the "fiscal contracting system" operating between the central and provincial governments from 
1980-93 JQW also found that the central government was not able to keep its commitment to restrain from offering 
ex post subsidies to sub-national governments. 
57 Yet, the TVEs did not suffer much from the SBC syndrome, as millions of them went bankrupt in 1989, even 
though they were supported by community governments and many of them also had policy burdens for community 
employment and social security. This is because at the bottom level of the hierarchy, community governments, as 
well as local branches of rural credit cooperatives, have limited financial resources available in their disposal. 
Moreover, their access to subsidies and credits from the central government is restricted by law. These limitations 
have prevented community governments from bailing out loss-making TVEs (Qian and Xu, 1993). Moreover, given 
local governments’ limited financial resources, they face high opportunity costs for bailing out failing firms. When 
regional competition is tougher, the opportunity cost becomes higher and local governments would be less willing to 
bailout their failing firms (Qian and Roland, 1998). 
58 Concurrent with increased state sector losses, between 1993 and 1995, inflation also worsened. A loss of control 
over monetary policy due to decentralization in credit control was blamed as the cause (Wang, 1991; Huang, 1996). 
Sharing a similar perspective, Brandt and Zhu (2000) argue that facing competition from the non-state sector, the 
central government was forced to rely on money creation to finance the state sector, since the central government 
supports the employment and investment of the state sector. This not only softened budget constraints of the state 
sector but also caused inflation. 
59 Around that time, some authoritative China experts, such as Nicolas Lardy (1998), worried that with a continued 




Lin, Cai, and Zhou, 1998). With the policy burdens, the state is accountable for the losses 
incurred from policy burdens, and thus it has to bailout insolvent SOEs (Lin and Tan, 1999).60  
There were intense political controversies in drafting, updating and finalizing the bankruptcy 
law from the 1986 version to the final 2006 version (Booth, 2004).61 Facing vast difficulties and 
political risks, China’s bankruptcy reform was carried out through local experiments to deal with 
the social and fiscal consequences of SOE insolvencies, and was used by central policymakers in 
their debates, decisions and lawmaking etc. (Heilmann, 2008). 
 
Table 5. Losses and Layoffs in the State Sector, 1991 to 2005 
  Losses (bil) Profits (bil) Layoffs (mil)
Net Profit 
(bil) 
1991 92.59 74.5   -18.1 
1992 75.68 95.5   19.8 
1993 46.94 166.7   119.8 
1994 62.45 160.8   98.4 
1995 80.21 147.0   66.8 
1996 112.7 87.7 5.42 -25.0 
1997 142.09 54.0 6.34 -88.1 
1998 306.65 21.4 5.95 -285.3 
1999 214.49 114.6 6.53 -99.9 
2000 184.6 283.4 6.57 98.8 
2001 199.36 281.1 5.15 81.8 
2002 180.25 378.6 4.10 198.4 
2003 281.98 476.9 2.60 195.0 
2004 303.06 736.9 1.53 433.8 
2005 331.39 958.0 0.61 626.6 
Sources: China Fiscal Yearbook, 1996-2006; China Accounting Yearbook, 1995-2006; China Labor and Social 
Security Yearbook, 2006; China Labor Economic Yearbook, 1997-98.  
Losses: the total losses in the state sector; Profits: the total profits from the profitable SOEs; Layoffs: the 
accumulated number of employees laid-off by the state sector. 
 
One of the most contested political and legal issues in China’s bankruptcy reform was about 
who should be assigned with priority protection in the liquidation of assets. Should that be given 
to creditors (state banks, i.e. government assets) or to employees (the source of potential social 
unrest)? (Heilmann, 2008). The first bankruptcy law, the “Experimental Bankruptcy Law” 
passed in 1986, was more creditor-friendly. Instead of being a law to be enforced nationwide, 
however, this law only served as a guideline for central government-sponsored local experiments. 
Very importantly, in experiments, local governments deviated from the law substantially. To 
prevent local social problems, the administrative practice of local governments in dealing with 
insolvent enterprises favored employees (Heilmann, 2008). The early reform progressed fairly 
                                                        
60 In this logic, Lin and Li (2007) argue that even privatization will not necessarily harden budget constraints. This is 
because bearing policy burdens, to provide the same policy service a private enterprise will demand more ex post 
subsidies from the government than an SOE due to more agency problems between the state and private firms. 
61  Controversies revolved around safeguarding state assets in liquidations; containing the social and financial 
consequences of SOE insolvencies; dealing with unemployment and rearranging the social safety net function of the 
SOEs (pensions, health care, housing, etc.) (Heilmann, 2008). 
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slowly, so that between 1989 and 1993, among tens of thousands of chronicle loss-making SOEs 
there were only 1,150 bankruptcy cases nationwide.  
Pressured by rapidly growing SOE debts and mounting state bank-held NPLs, bankruptcy 
reform emerged as a top-priority issue in the 1990s. The central government sponsored new 
waves of local bankruptcy experiments.62 In the peak years of restructuring and bankruptcy 
reforms, from 1996 to 2001, every year there were more than 5 or 6 million SOE employees laid 
off nationwide relatively peacefully (Table 5). Summarizing local experiment practices, the 2002 
and 2004 versions of the bankruptcy law gave workers first priority over the rights of secured 
creditors; and the burden of providing compensation to the employees of insolvent enterprises 
was put on local governments. As a result, the state sector was significantly transformed, from 
losing 285 billion RMB in 1998 to profiting 99 billion RMB in 2000 and 627 billion RMB in 
2005, when bankruptcy and layoffs became negligible (Table 5). SOE productivity in the 
corresponding period also improved significantly (Brandt, Hsieh and Zhu, 2008; Jefferson, 
Rawski and Zhang, 2008).63 
Experimental bankruptcy reform processes helped “to conceal and manage fundamental 
political-ideological controversies that were at the heart of the delayed law-making. Policy 
experimentation over 23 years allowed recurrent adaptations in the application of the basic 
priority scheme and thereby helped to avoid open policy conflicts” (Heilmann, 2008). When the 
bankruptcy reform was carried out by local experiments, the law was only “provisionary” and 
formal bankruptcy proceedings in courts played a minor role. Generally, corporate rescue 
measures were undertaken through a variety of flexible, inconsistent, but less painful policies 
which were experimented with locally (Heilmann, 2008). The final version of the Bankruptcy 
Law (2006) was not passed until the reform experiments were over and the number of 
bankruptcy cases dropped drastically. However, the final version of the law goes back to the 
protection of creditors and did not retain those policies in favor of protecting workers vis-à-vis 
creditors.  
 
5.3 Privatization: Locally Initiated Experiments 
Although there is no empirical work that decomposes factors contributing to the turnaround 
of the state sector from chronicle loss-making to a profitable sector, perhaps the most effective 
reform was privatization, which sold most of the loss-making firms to private owners. In sharp 
contrast to other transition economies, where privatization was pushed through by the central 
governments as a high priority at the beginning of the transition, privatization was and is a highly 
controversial subject in China due to ideological and political reasons. As a result, privatization 
has been postponed by the Chinese government as much as possible. Moreover, the Chinese 
privatization scheme is not based on a rational design; instead, it is a result of political games 
given existing institutions. Due to this delay, at the time of privatization, even though the state 
sector was loss-making and was deeply in debt, the national economy was in a better shape and 
conditions for privatization were more ready than all other transition economies when they 
                                                        
62 In 1994 the State Council issued a circular on trial implementation of new insolvency procedures and sponsored 
experiments in 18 cities. Two years later trial implementations of new merger and insolvency procedures were tested 
in 56 cities. In the next year the State Council sponsored experiments in 117 cities for trial implementation of 
merger, bankruptcy, and reemployment procedures. 
63  Of course, given that many reform measures were taking place in the same period of time, such as 
privatization, layoffs, change of corporate governance, market competition, large scale FDI and lower interest rates, 
it is a challenge for researchers to find out what specific reform measure has exactly contributed by how much to the 
improvements of productivity and profitability of Chinese firms. 
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launched privatization. The non-state sector had already surpassed the state sector in the national 
economy, while the market had already replaced most of the planning related to resource 
allocation, including the product, capital, labour, and managerial labour markets, etc. Moreover, 
the improved productivity of the state sector through earlier reforms, as discussed in Section 5.2, 
might also have played an important role in making the transition smooth. Furthermore, the 
Chinese privatization has been carried out by municipal governments at their discretion, under 
regional competition for economic growth. That is, they have opted not to privatize if doing so 
would hurt their regional growth. As a result, China is an exceptional case among all transition 
economies which did not suffer from recessions as CEE-FSU economies did during their 
privatizations (Estrin, Hanousek, Kočenda and Svejnar, 2009; hereafter abbreviated as EHKS). 
Instead, China’s privatization is associated with a high growth rate. 
Privatization was officially banned, and in practice it was not encouraged by the central 
government until the late 1990s. However, given the local “ownership” of most of the Chinese 
SOEs and pressures faced by local governments, de facto privatization was tried quietly without 
official permission from the central government in the process of restructuring local SOEs before 
the mid-1990s. Even in the late 1990s, it is still a city government’s decision whether or not to 
privatize and how to privatize within their jurisdictions (Garnaut et al, 2001, 2005; Gan, Guo and 
Xu, 2010, hereafter abbreviated as GGX). Moreover, even by then, due to political and 
ideological constraints, privatization has occurred in a camouflaged form such that the term 
“privatization” is officially disguised as “transforming the system” or “gaizhi” in Chinese 
(Garnaut et al., 2001, 2005). Nevertheless, in 2005, about two-thirds of the Chinese SOEs and 
COEs with annual turnover of more than 5 million RMB Yuan (about $620,000) have been 
privatized and the total asset value involved in the process was about 11.4 trillion RMB (or 1.63 
trillion USD) in 2005 (Guo, Gan and Xu, 2008). 64 Due to its recentness and the lack of data, the 
research on China’s privatization is still very limited (EHKS). 
One of the early major reforms attempted by many cities in the late 1980s, and which lead to 
privatization later, was the leasing of SOEs. The top managers of small- or medium-sized SOEs 
leased the firms by paying the sub-national government a fixed proportion of the firms’ profits. 
This reform gradually led to de facto privatization, since after some years of leasing the share 
value of a manager would outweigh that of the city government, the “state owner”. The other 
major reform initiative, which facilitated privatization later, was incorporation. Although 
officially incorporation was restricted to the exchange of shares among the SOEs, private 
shareholding was allowed in some cities. The first reported cases were in Guangzhou in the late 
1980s, when employees of some SOEs bought substantial amount of shares of the firms where 
they worked. Under severe political and ideological constraints, to contain the risks of 
privatization, a prevailing privatization strategy chosen by most Chinese city governments is to 
sell the ownership of SOEs and COEs to their employees. This is because employee ownership is 
least controversial politically and ideologically.  
Similar to the situation of the bankruptcy reform, the most important impetus for privatizing 
SOEs was the large amount of debt built up by the state sector in the 1990s. Distinctively 
different from the central government’s sponsorship of the bankruptcy reform, however, 
privatization was initiated by city governments. The central government tolerated this by turning 
a blind eye to the actions of city governments. One of the first regional privatization experiments 
was in Zhucheng, a city in Shandong province. In that city, more than two thirds of the SOEs 
were loss-making in 1992, with losses amounting to the city government’s total fiscal revenue 
                                                        
64 Based on the data collected from a nationwide random survey of all Chinese industrial firms conducted in 2006. 
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over 18 months. The city government sold many SOEs to their employees. Another 
representative example is the municipal government of Shunde in Guangdong. The Shunde city 
government also encountered a serious debt problem when it privatized most of its state and 
collective firms in 1992 (Garnaut et al., 2005).  
As a result of successful local experiments with privatization and the severity of SBC 
problems in the state sector, privatization was gradually accepted by the central government 
through several steps, from an explicit “tolerance” policy to some proactive guidelines on 
privatization.65 Finally, a green light was given by the CCP’s 15th Congress (1997), which 
granted de jure ownership of local SOEs to local governments. By default, this implies that the 
centre has authorized the ‘owners,’ mostly city governments, of smaller SOEs to try everything 
on their own, including privatization, although this has never been explicit. With this major 
change, the scale of privatization gradually enlarged after 1997. 
China’s regional experiments on privatization have adopted multiple approaches. These 
approaches include share issue privatization (SIP), joint ventures with foreign firms, 
management buyouts (MBO), and sales to outsiders. Privatization in China has created 
concentrated private ownership and about half of privatized firms in China were sold to 
managers, i.e. through MBO, which has greatly changed corporate governance and corporate 
performance (GGX). 
Not every privatization approach was effective. Based on their nationwide random 
sampling survey data, by controlling for privatized and not privatized firms; before privatization 
and after privatization, based on a nationwide random survey, GGX found that among all 
privatization methods, only MBO had statistically significant positive impacts to the 
restructuring, corporate governance and performance. One of the most important changes 
associated with MBO is that the state has retreated from firms after privatization. That is, after 
buying out the firm owner-managers became the decision-makers of their own firms on issues 
like hiring, layoffs, wages, compensation, production, marketing, and investments etc. Moreover, 
MBO firms substantially restructured in a deeper way than other privatized firms. As a result, 
MBO had a statistically significant positive impact on improving firm performance.66 In contrast, 
governments still kept substantial controls over those firms privatized through other methods, 
and these privatization strategies failed to improve performance (GGX). 
It is the decision of a given municipal governments whether to privatize and, if so, how to 
privatize. According to a nationwide random survey, MBO was chosen mostly by those cities 
that had stronger fiscal discipline and/or were less concerned about shedding labour, such as fast 
growing coastal cities like Ningbo, Wenzhou, Hangzhou, Changzhou and Wuxi etc. Meanwhile, 
non-MBO approaches were chosen mainly by those city governments that had weak fiscal 
discipline and a concentration of the state sector, such as heavy industrial cities like Changchun, 
                                                        
65 In 1993, the 3rd Plenum of the 14th CCP Congress endorsed the creation of a modern enterprise system, which 
approved the development of diversified forms of ownership including private ownership. Although much of the 
political constraints on privatization were still in place, this created a more tolerable environment for local 
privatization experiments. In 1995, the central government announced the policy of “retain the large, release the 
small” (zhuada fangxiao), i.e. the state was to keep the largest few hundred SOEs in strategic industries and to give 
local governments full control rights to local SOEs. 
66 Without differentiating between MBO and non-MBO privatization, by examining formerly state-owned large and 
medium-size enterprises for the period from 1994 to 1999 nationwide, Jefferson and Su (2006) found that 
privatization increased productivity and investments in research and development. Similarly, based on firm level 
data collected from one city, Dong, Putterman and Unel (2006) found that privatization has significantly improved 
productivity and profitability for urban firms.   
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Jinzhou, Handan and Xian, etc. (GGX).  
The process of privatization illustrates the importance of regional experiments in advancing 
China’s reforms. To make this picture sharper, it is important to point out that MBO was never 
favoured by the central government. In fact, the mass media, which has been tightly controlled by the 
central government, was hostile to MBO. In contrast, the central government-sponsored major 
ownership reforms, such as share issuing privatization, failed to improve the performance of SOEs.67   
 
5.4 The Impacts of Regional Decentralization on Growth  
It is a major challenge to study the impact of regional decentralization on economic growth 
empirically. One of the most difficult issues is how to measure regional decentralization. The 
Chinese regional decentralization involves much more than simply fiscal decentralization. But 
how to measure statistically non-fiscal elements of regional decentralization is an unsettled 
subject. Moreover, regional decentralization captures only part of the operations of China’s RDA 
regime. The effectiveness of regional experiments and regional competition is often conditioned 
on effectiveness of central control. That is, centralization is an essential part of the picture. In 
addition to the conceptual and theoretical problems in the literature, the lack of statistics on 
broadly defined decentralization is another major problem yet to be resolved. Given the 
difficulties, most of the empirical literature concerning the impacts of regional decentralization 
on growth is restricted to fiscal decentralization.  
Lin and Liu (2000) (abbreviated as LL hereafter) and Jin, Qian and Weingast (2005) 
(abbreviated as JQW henceforth) found that fiscal decentralization contributed to regional 
growth in general, and to the development of the regional non-state sector in particular. Zhang 
and Zou (1998) found a negative relationship between fiscal decentralization and regional 
economic growth in China, but LL and JQW suggested potential data and methodological 
problems in Zhang and Zou.  
LL uses provincial data from 1970 to 1993 to study the impact of fiscal decentralization on 
regional economic growth. Their regressions are based on a Solow type of growth model. 
Economic growth is decomposed into growth of per capita investment and growth of total factor 
productivity. All the major reforms included in the regression models are related to regional 
decentralization. The major focus of the paper is fiscal decentralization. In addition, other 
reforms included in the regression model are the HRS reform; and the share of non-SOEs' output 
in the total industrial output. As discussed in previous sections, the HRS reform and non-state 
sector development are all consequences of regional decentralization. Therefore, together with 
fiscal decentralization these variables capture a large part of regional decentralization. At the 
same time, their regression models also control for the growth rate of per capita investment, the 
financial strength of a region, the impacts of urbanization and the size of the population on 
economic growth, and price liberalization. All of these control variables have insignificant 
impacts to regional growth.  
LL discovered that, everything else being equal, the growth rate of per capita provincial GDP 
would increase by 3.62% in response to an increase of the marginal retention rate of regional 
fiscal revenue from 0 to 100%. Moreover, the impact of the HRS on regional growth rates was 
similar to that of the fiscal decentralization. Furthermore, among all regional decentralization 
variables, the one with the largest impact was the non-state sector development. Everything else 
                                                        
67 It has been shown that China’s share issue privatization has failed to contain costs and improve profitability (Sun 
and Tong, 2003; Deng, Gan, and He, 2008). 
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being equal, the regional GDP growth rate would increase by 14.2 % if the share of the non-state 
sector increased from 0 to 100%.  
Consistent with LL, by using provincial data from 1980 to 1993, JQW found that stronger 
fiscal incentives are associated with faster development of non-state enterprises and with greater 
reforms in state-owned enterprises. Furthermore, JQW found provincial governments in China 
faced stronger ex post fiscal incentives after the reform. Specifically, they found a strong 
correlation between the current provincial budgetary revenue and its expenditure for the period 
of 1982-91 when the “fiscal contracting system” was implemented. The JQW discovery is 
echoed by a literature which argues that the different fiscal federalist approaches used by China 
and the FSU are related to well/poorly defined tax rights for sub-national governments and 
strong/weak fiscal incentives for sub-national governments. Some of this literature claims that 
these shed light on the performance gap between China and Russia (Shleifer, 1997; Berkowitz 
and Li, 2000; Zhuravaskaya, 2000).  
However, the results of both LL and JQW are based on data up to 1993. As discussed 
previously, fiscal policy was substantially recentralized after 1994. This makes these results 
vulnerable to challenges (Tsui and Wang, 2004; Mertha, 2005).  
Nevertheless, the LL-JQW evidence constitutes a valuable step in understanding the impacts 
of regional decentralization on regional growth. After all, fiscal decentralization is an important 
part of regional decentralization, which includes land reform, SEZs and non-state sector 
development, etc. The period before 1994 is one in which fiscal decentralization is fully 
consistent with regional decentralization in general. Thus, fiscal decentralization may be a good 
proxy for regional decentralization in that period of time. However, the contribution of non-fiscal 
reforms to economic growth is pooled together with fiscal decentralization so that the 
contribution of each remains entangled. That is, the identification problem has yet to be resolved 
in this literature.  
Last but not least, it should be pointed out that although taxation has been recentralized since 
the mid 1990s, it is not clear that regional decentralization has been reversed completely in 
general. Firstly, in the same period of ‘fiscal recentralization’ sub-national governments gained 
more power in some non-fiscal spheres. Endorsed by the 15th Party’s Congress in 1997, sub-
national governments’ de facto ownership over regional SOEs has been transformed into de jure 
or nearly de jure ownership.68 Together with other major changes, this endorsement paved the 
road for sub-national governments to privatize SOEs and COEs (Garnaut et al., 2005). Moreover, 
sub-national governments were authorized to sell land within their jurisdictions. Secondly, these 
changes in turn have had impacts on fiscal matters, so that the revenues of sub-national 
governments in more developed regions created through privatization and selling land in the past 
years could sufficiently offset losses of their tax revenue. Control rights over land give sub-
national government important leverage over regional development, regional industrial policy 
and over macro control of the region (to be further discussed in Section 6.1). To summarize, 
although the share of sub-national governments’ tax revenue in national tax revenue was reduced 
substantially, sub-national governments’ importance in regional governance and in national 
economic development remains essential. The central government still relies on sub-national 
governments to govern the bulk of the Chinese economy and sub-national governments still 
                                                        
68 In 2005, sub-national governments owned about thirty-one thousand SOEs plus control of a huge number of 
COEs (NSB, 2006) whereas the central government owned 166 firms (the State-Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission, or SASAC: http://www.sasac.gov.cn/gzwgk/gzwgk_jj.htm). 
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dominate regional economic affairs, including fiscal and non fiscal matters, such as allocating 
critical resources to firms, dealing with contract enforcement and property rights protection, etc.  
  
6. Tradeoffs of Regional Decentralization 
 
 Rent-seeking behaviour and general conservatism are inherent features of an authoritarian 
regime, therefore making them difficult to reform. However, under the RDA regime, rents could 
be eliminated if sub-national governments face fierce regional competition: given the importance 
of winning the competition, if losing a competition implies losing a position, which is the 
necessary condition for enjoying rents. Moreover, as discussed in Section 2, regional 
experimentation and regional competition can alleviate the problem of conservatism, enabling 
reforms to move forward.  
 However, regional competition and regional experimentation are effective only when sub-
national governments’ tasks can be summarized by a single indicator, e.g. economic growth. If 
sub-national governments face multiple tasks that cannot be encompassed under a single 
objective, regional competition and regional experiments may become focused on tasks, which 
are more measurable, while less measurable tasks are ignored. In that case, high-powered 
incentives created through regional competition may lead to undesirable consequences. Even 
worse than this, sub-national governments may be induced to race to the bottom, i.e. regions may 
compete in or may experiment on some policies which may benefit regional officials but damage 
most other citizens, or may benefit the region but damage other regions.  
 At earlier stages of the reform, it was commonly agreed by the central government, sub-
national governments and citizens that economic growth was the most important objective of 
China’s economic reform. Under that consensus, other objectives can be overlooked so long as 
the economy grows rapidly. Thus, regional competition and regional experiments faced easier 
tradeoffs. Moreover, at earlier stages of the reforms, most growth-enhancing policies and 
institutional changes avoided immediate conflicts among stakeholders. The land reform (HRS 
reform) distributed land equally among rural households. The TVE development and other non-
state sector developments, including SEZs, were less intrusive to rural stakeholders’ interests, 
such as land.   
 However, after a quarter century’s fast economic growth, the multi-task nature of sub-
national governments’ duties has become more pronounced and the general consensus on the 
importance of economic growth has broken down. Many major growth-enhancing reforms 
implemented since the mid-1990s generated immediate conflicts among stakeholders. A 
prominent example is firm restructuring and privatization, which started in the 1990s. In those 
reforms, a large number of SOE employees were laid off, whereas new private owners obtained 
huge amounts of wealth through management-buy-outs. Another example is associated with 
large-scale rapid urbanization, which converts arable land for non-agricultural developments and 
creates a great number of landless peasants. This often leads to sharp conflicts between those 
who lost land without receiving proper compensation, and property developers who profited 
immensely from the transactions, and are usually closely associated with sub-national 
governments.  
 
6.1 Law and Regulation 
Under the RDA regime, Chinese sub-national governments play significant roles in both law 
enforcement and lawmaking. The aforementioned provincial law on SEZs, “the Regulation for 
53 
 
Guangdong SEZs” illustrates that sub-national legislation can also serve as the experimental 
basis for new national legislation. Sub-national governments were endowed with lawmaking 
power since the PRC’s founding in 1949. Although most of their de jure lawmaking power was 
taken away during the centralization movement of the 1950s, sub-national governments kept 
some de facto lawmaking powers. At the onset of the reform, sub-national governments regained 
much of their lawmaking power (http://www.china.com.cn/zhuanti2005/txt/2003-
02/27/content_5283965.htm), and these gains were institutionalized by the 1982 constitutional 
amendment. In addition, the central government from time to time experimented with giving 
additional lawmaking powers to sub-national governments, such as “authorized lawmaking 
power” (shouquan lifa) or “beforehand lawmaking power” (xianxing lifa). As a result, more than 
six thousands laws have enacted by sub-national governments nationwide since 1978. Conflicts 
that arise between regional laws and national laws is one of the major concerns of this system, 
although in principle whenever there are conflicts the national law overrules. 
However, the starting point of China’s legal reform is among the weakest of all transition 
economies, since during the CR China dismantled its formal legal system. As a result, China has 
had to build its legal system virtually from scratch during the reform era. Moreover, ideological 
and political constraints delayed major legal reforms, such as the protection of private property 
rights, etc. Together with the lack of judiciary independence, China was in a weaker position 
than average transition economies in terms of legal reforms. It is not surprising that a lack of 
proper law and law enforcement can lead to serious problems, and I will discuss some of the 
most serious problems related to Chinese law later in this subsection. However, the coexistence 
of very fast-growing businesses, including the private sector, and a very weak formal legal sector 
is puzzling. The solution to this puzzle lies in the fact that regionally decentralized administrative 
measures step in as substitutes for law and law enforcement (Pistor and Xu, 2005).69 In the past, 
this has sometimes helped avoid governance vacuums, as private businesses were at times 
disguised by sub-national governments. Indeed, many of the initiatives and protections provided 
by sub-national governments to private firms flew in the face of the constitution. Thus, strong 
incentives given to sub-national governments played essential roles for them to take the risks 
associated with their unconstitutional actions.  
The roles of the municipal governments of Taizhou and Wenzhou of Zhejiang province in 
developing private sectors ahead of relevant legal developments illustrate this point. The 
municipal governments offered “red heads” to private firms within their jurisdiction to conceal 
their vulnerable legal status, thereby giving the outsiders the illusion of official government 
sanction. Thanks to this kind of development in many regions where sub-national governments 
provided similar protections, the private sector in China experienced double-digit growth for 
more than a decade without full legal protection. To some extent it is this spectacular 
development of the private sector which catalyzed the legalization of private property rights. 
When the constitutional protection of private property rights was enacted in 2004 the private 
sector was already the dominant sector in Zhejiang and one of the largest sectors in China.  
Concerning regulation, given its weakness in legal institutions, under the RDA regime, 
China introduced an administration-based regulatory decentralization scheme. In this scheme, the 
                                                        
69 It is worthwhile to note that there are many cases in which business practice preceded relevant laws in European 
and American history. For example, important securities laws (US 1933/34 Acts) were developed decades behind 
major developments in US securities markets. However, in Europe/US, there were functioning legal systems that 
effectively enforced general laws, such as contract law, tort law etc., on new business practices (Xu and Pistor, 2008). 
But in Chinese reforms, a basic functioning legal system itself is under construction. Thus, sub-national 
governments are essential as substituting mechanisms to fill in the governance gap (Pistor and Xu, 2005). 
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central regulatory authorities break down the regulatory tasks and delegate them to sub-national 
governments. Together with regional competition, this system sometimes is able to implement 
some national regulatory goals; sometimes fails to do so. The regulatory scheme evolved in 
recent twenty years relies essentially on sub-national governments’ assistance and cooperation 
for enforcement of its regulations (Du and Xu, 2008). In this system, one of the major 
instruments that are deployed is the quota system.  
The bank credit quota system, which was utilized by the People’s Bank of China (PBC) 
to control the aggregate money supply until 1998, is an example of one such quota (Du and Xu, 
2008). The PBC formulated the national credit plan and allocated credit quotas to the 
headquarters of all major state banks, which in turn reallocated these to their regional branches 
and subsidiaries. The regional allocation of bank credit quotas depends largely on regional 
banking performance, measured in ways such as the amount of deposits taken by regional banks 
in the previous year; regional economic performance; and a variety of other metrics. The bank 
credit quota system was a major instrument for implementing macroeconomic policies in general 
and monetary policy in particular until market-based credit allocation mechanisms were 
somewhat deployed in the late 1990s.  
Another major example is the evolution of Chinese financial market regulation. China’s 
securities markets, the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, initially emerged as self-
regulated regional markets with supervision from the corresponding municipal governments 
(Green, 2004). The quota system of equity share issuance was introduced to the Chinese equity 
market in 1993, and was designed to control the size of financial markets to maintain balance 
among the regions and to preserve the dominant position of public ownership. The central 
government would determine the total number of shares to be issued in the nation and then 
would allocate stock issuance quotas to regions and ministries. Sub-national governments in turn 
would allocate quotas to selected SOEs for going public through IPOs or to listed companies 
seeking SEOs. The sub-national governments would collect information on these firms and 
submit it to the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), the national regulatory agent. 
After reviewing the company information, the CSRC would give its approval to companies to 
issue shares in the public equity markets. The quota system was officially in place from 1993 to 
2000; however, it actually governed financial markets up until around 2003 (Pistor and Xu, 
2005). 
Although the quota system was not designed for dealing with informational or incentive 
problems, several bodies of evidence indicate that it has played a significant role in creating 
incentives for regional competition and decentralized information collection in stock issuance. 
Based on the data of all listed firms from 1993 to 2004, after controlling for political factors, 
macro variables etc., Du and Xu (2008) find that firms located in regions with better 
performance obtained more quotas in subsequent periods. In explaining firm-level quotas by 
provincial performance, this result essentially rules out the possibility of reverse causality, since 
none of the firms in the sample were large enough to affect provincial performance. In addition, 
the data demonstrate that everything else being equal, listed firms from provinces that disclosed 
information better were rewarded with more stock quotas in the ensuing periods. Moreover, the 
quality of regional information disclosure was substantially more important than other factors, 
such as regional corporate or macro performances, in determining how quotas were allocated. 
These findings suggest that provinces which performed better in various aspects previously 
would be given a higher stock issuance quota later from the central government. That is, the 
quota allocation functioned as a de facto incentive device that induced sub-national governments 
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to select better-performing firms for initial public offerings (IPOs) or seasoned equity offerings 
(SEOs). Finally, detailed evidence from 23 provincial-level regions suggests that the majority of 
IPO firms selected by sub-national governments had been better-performing state-owned 
enterprises before they went public (Du and Xu, 2009). This further indicates that the Chinese 
regulatory decentralization is somewhat effective at the IPO stage.  
However, administration-based regulatory decentralization is not always effective, and it 
is not a long-term substitute for law enforcement. There are several conditions that must be met 
for decentralized admin measures to function well as a substitute for conventional legal 
institutions. Firstly, sub-national governments must have substantial control rights over the 
regulatory subjects; otherwise, sub-national governments would not play a major regulatory role 
(e.g. the quota system does not work effectively for non-state-owned firms and cannot ensure 
adequate corporate governance of listed companies). Secondly, sub-national governments must 
have strong vested interests in the subjects of regulation; otherwise, sub-national governments 
would not be motivated to participate. Finally, the central government must have direct control 
over the resources to be allocated by a quota system; otherwise information problem will disable 
the system. For example, the quotas systems used for bank credit control and for environment 
protection did not work well since these quotas are nominal that the financial resources and 
pollutant emissions are directly controlled by local governments and they can easily manipulate 
the information.   
In order to prevent excessive conversion of arable land for non-agricultural uses, the Chinese 
government has applied a land quota system to regulate local governments’ land conversion. 
Each region is allocated a land-use quota for each year and regions violating the land-use quota 
would face a deduction in future quota allocation, together with other penalties. Moreover, an 
official’s compliance with quotas is taken as part of the criteria for evaluating his work. However, 
because this quota system violates all the three aforementioned conditions, the land quota system 
fails to work.  
In fact, the land problem is one the most serious social problems in China and it can be used 
as an illustration how China’s RDA system makes troubles to the economy. Deeply-flawed laws 
governing land ownership and fiscal recentralization “collectively” incentivize local 
governments to ignore the quota system (Kung, Xu and Zhou, 2009; hereafter abbreviated as 
KXZ). Arable land in China is de jure collectively-owned, and in this system, the commune 
authorities before the reform, and the village authorities afterwards, represent the collectives. 
Although rights of use and income over land have been reassigned to the farm households since 
the land reform of the early 1980s, the farmers have no right to alter the land’s usage, or to 
transfer it to another party. The crucial right to transfer these rights has remained in the hands of 
the state and, in part, of the village authorities. Yet, the collective owners have no right to convert 
arable land into non-arable usages. Nationalization has been the only legal mechanism by which 
farmland can be converted into non-arable usages since any non-arable usage of collective 
farmland requires a change from collective to state ownership (Articles 63 and 43 of the Land 
Management Law of 1999). Moreover, the law confines farmers’ rights in land to basically an 
“agrarian” usage when land use is changed to non-agrarian and ownership converted (from 
collective to state). In other words, farmers would only be compensated according to the value of 
crop production after conversion, even though the land post-conversion may be far more 
valuable. Apart from the minimal compensation which is legally protected, China’s farmers are 
subject to the whims of local authorities in the process of land conversion (KXZ).  
As discussed previously, the fiscal recentralization of 1994 reduced the share of local 
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governments’ entitlement to most tax sources. To compensate local governments for the losses, 
local governments were assigned greater control rights over revenues generated by land sales 
within their jurisdictions. From 2002 onwards the central government further proposed to 
appropriate 50% of the enterprise profit tax, which greatly disincentivizes local governments’ 
efforts to improve enterprise efficiency. The fiscal recentralization, together with the monopoly 
right assigned to local governments over the conversion of farmland to non-arable uses, has 
induced local governments to switch from a passion for industrialization to “urbanization” frenzy 
(KXZ). 
Blessed with escalating land prices (especially for commercial and real estate developments 
in premium locations) on the one hand and artificially low compensations on the other, many 
local governments, particularly those in the rapidly-developing coastal areas, have pocketed 
“windfall profits” from this urbanization process. Attracted by the huge “windfall profits”, land 
conversion has accelerated after 1999. In 2003 the state became worried that China would soon 
deplete its arable land below its threshold required for food self-sufficiency. In an attempt to 
slow down the conversion of farmland, since 2001 the central government has set land 
conversion quotas for all provinces for each year. But with seriously distorted incentives, the 
land quota assignment did not work. Much worse, in the process of land conversion local 
authorities have triggered serious conflicts with the farmers, as a large number of farmers lost 
their primary source of livelihood with minimal compensation. They feel that they have been 
robbed of the bundle of rights assigned to them at the outset of the reform. Opposite to the 
harmonious atmosphere at the era of land reform, i.e. the early 1980s, now land expropriation by 
local governments becomes one of the worst sources of social conflicts in China (Guo, 2001; Li 
and O’Brien, 2008). This illustrates that without a properly developed legal system many 
problems cannot be resolved by regional competition, regional experimentation, personnel 
control and other methods deployed by the RDA regime. 
 
6.2 Regional protections 
Regional decentralization alone may not automatically guarantee growth-enhancing regional 
competition. Without checks of the central government, sub-national officials may restrict cross 
regional trade to protect firms within their jurisdiction. Indeed, it is oft-cited that sub-national 
governments opt to put up barriers to shield local firms and industries from competition. It was 
documented that in the mid-1980s many sub-national governments tried to retain low priced raw 
materials, such as wool or silk, within their jurisdictions in order to favor local manufacturers 
(Watson, Findlay et al. 1989; Bernstein and Lu, 2000), and this was also widely reported by both 
domestic and international mass media coverage.70  
If there are no effective central-government policies to keep barriers in check, in addition to 
making factors immobile as most often emphasized in the literature, regional protection could 
destroy regional competition itself, one of the basic mechanisms that drive China’s reform and 
development. Moreover, interregional trade barriers and regional protectionism can eventual lead 
to serious political problems, such as disintegration of the country.  
Recognizing the seriousness of the problem, the Chinese central government has battled 
                                                        
70 For example, a New York Times report illustrated trade barriers among Chinese regions. To protect their local 
made car manufacturers, “Tianjin local officials barred taxi companies in the city from buying Geelys,” which are 
produced by a Zhejiang-based car manufacturer (NYT, 11/17/2006).  Casual observations confirm this as a general 
phenomenon that most taxi cabs in many major cities, e.g. Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Changchun, Guangzhou, etc., 
are made locally.  
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against regional protectionism repeatedly during the whole reform period. The central 
government has issued decrees in 1982, 1990, and 2001 to curb regional protectionism (Holz, 
2009). A State Council circular of 10 April 1982 states: “regional or departmental (trade) 
blockages … are extremely harmful to China’s economy in total.” The State Council clarified 
that enterprises had the authority to sell their above-plan output anywhere in the country they 
wanted, and sub-national governments were not to interfere in the distribution of the above-plan 
output. In 1990 the State Council issued a circular on breaking inter-regional blockades. It 
requires that all regional trade checkpoints must be rectified, and differential tax rates based on 
product origin were prohibited. The State Council issued another regulation in 2001 to deal with 
issues of the malfunctioning of the “market order,” including regional trade barriers. It contains 
detailed stipulations for eliminating specific kinds of regional trade barriers (Holz, 2009). The 
great efforts of the central government in containing regional protectionism demonstrate the 
stubbornness of the problem and the determination of the central government to contain the 
problem. It also underscores the “checks-and-balances” between the central government and sub-
national governments in the context of regional competition.  
Whether or not the central government’s efforts in confining regional protectionism and 
whether or not regional fragmentation has worsened during the reform have been debated 
intensively in the literature. There is abundant literature about, statistical evidence of, and mass 
media coverage of the fast growing inter-regional trade (Holz, 2009). Indeed, one of the most 
important early reforms in the early 1980s was the legalization of cross-region trade carried out 
by state and non-state merchants, including private traders. Lau, Qian and Roland (2000) contend 
that the “dual-track system” introduced during the reforms promotes interregional trade, because 
under this system, local officials can “sell” the rights to purchase a certain percentage of raw 
materials and final products at lowered planned prices. Since opening up the market to other 
regions may significantly increase the market price, this system is beneficial for local officials.  
In an ideal situation with perfect national markets, all factors would be mobile, and therefore 
their productivities across regions would be equalized; regional economies would utilize their 
comparative advantages, their production would be specialized, and regional prices for the same 
products would converge. Based on this idea, taking the first best case as the benchmark, it has 
been argued that Chinese economy has become fragmented regionally, and that the situation was 
getting worse. Young (2000) reported widespread convergence in the regional structure of 
production during the reform period, and a rise in the interregional variation of prices during the 
1980s. Moreover, there was a divergence of regional relative factor allocations and labour 
productivities. These findings were interpreted as evidence of industrial duplication across 
regions caused by regional barriers. Based on this he claimed that regional protection in China 
was worsening, and that Chinese reforms resulted in a fragmented internal market with fiefdoms 
controlled by local officials. To some extent, similarly, by studying capital mobility across 
provinces, Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2005) found great discrepancies in regional marginal 
capital productivities, and from this concluded that the Chinese financial system was regionally 
fragmented.  
However, by using more diverse and recent data than that of Young (2000), Bai, Du, Tao and 
Tong (2004) found that regional specialization has increased and has become dominant over the 
forces of regional protection in recent years. Moreover, with a data set that consists of 93 
products in 36 cities over more than ten years, Fan and Wei (2006) provided evidence of market 
integration during the reform period. They found an overall price convergence in China that 
indicates that markets across different cities are indeed integrated. Furthermore, they found that 
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the products for which interregional trade was more likely to be restricted by local officials for 
rent-seeking purposes tended to converge to a greater degree of absolute price parity. This 
finding suggests that local protectionism might be a less important obstacle to inter-regional 
trade in China than some other factors, such as transportation costs.  
Yet, there are serious concerns regarding the methodologies used to study trade barriers. 
Specifically, focusing on measuring regional specialization alone may not be most helpful in 
understanding regional protection, since it does not have the warrant of a theoretical foundation. 
As Naughton (2003) points out, without an underlying theory and without a cross country 
comparison, i.e. without knowing proper benchmarks, looking at one country’s regional 
specialization alone might be misleading. Indeed, state manufacturing sectors in the U.S., an 
integrated national economy, became less specialized than before 1987, and they became more 
similar than they were in the past (Kim, 1995). Moreover, by using a similar approach, Holz 
(2009) finds that Chinese provinces are similar to American states in their degree of regional 
specialization. Echoing this finding, Fan and Wei (2006) also find the convergence trend in 
China is similar to those discovered in the US and Canada. In these three economies, many 
prices follow relative price convergence rather than absolute price convergence. Obviously, it 
will not be convincing to claim that market development in China is at a similar level of the US 
given this evidence. However, it would be even harder to claim, based on this methodology, that 
Chinese economic reforms have moved the economy further away from markets.  
In fact, it is quite likely that applying a similar approach, regional specialization in Russia, 
or more generally in the CIS and Central-Eastern European countries, is much higher than that in 
China before 1990. But it would be misleading to interpret this as evidence for more-developed 
markets in these locations. Indeed, based on the theories discussed in Sections 3 and 4, an 
economy with overly-specialized regions would hamper regional competition and 
experimentation. Of course, in those theories, the composition of regional economies is 
exogenous. A more complete theory has yet to be developed to analyse dynamics of regional 
competitions when both the composition of regional economies and scale economies are 
endogenously chosen by players.     
 
6.3 Regional disparity  
In light of record-breaking rapid and prolonged growth, the quickly-increasing disparity of 
wealth in China has become a major concern. It is commonly agreed in the literature that 
inequality in China has substantially worsened since the reforms, mainly in the past two decades. 
Based on household data from nine provinces, Benjamin, Brandt, Giles and Wang (2009; 
hereafter abbreviated as BBGW) find that the overall (combined urban-rural) Gini coefficient of 
China probably exceeds 0.50, which is approaching that of some of the most unequal countries in 
the world, e.g. South America. Based on provincial level aggregate data, Kanbur and Zhang 
(2005) found that, associated with the increase of GDP and trade, the Gini coefficient has 
increased from 0.29 in 1978 to 0.37 in 2000. To what degree regional decentralization has 
contributed to this increased inequality is a hotly-contested subject in the literature.  
The relationship between growth and inequality is a subject of debate in the literature (for a 
survey sees Aghion, Caroli and Garcia-Penalosa, 1999). In the classical view, inequality is 
regarded as necessary and transitional in the process of industrialization or growth (Kuznets, 
1955). Moreover, an increase of inequality may not be so bad even for the poor when an 
economy grows quickly, since the poor benefit more from increasing aggregate growth than from 
reducing inequality through redistribution (Dollar and Kraay, 2001). China’s rapidly increasing 
59 
 
per capita income came together with rises in inequality and is used as a major example to 
illustrate the above point (Quah, 2003). This line of thought would argue that the reform policy 
in the first two decades of Chinese reforms enabled some people to become rich first. Driven by 
this policy and implemented within the framework of regional decentralization, arguably, in the 
last quarter of century, China has experienced the largest scale of poverty reduction in human 
history. The Chinese population in absolute poverty (defined as $1/day income) has dropped 
from 50% to 7% in twenty years, while the number of individuals in absolute poverty was 
reduced by almost 400 million. This number is nearly three-quarters of poverty reduction in the 
whole developing world (World Bank, 1995).  
On the other hand, however, it is argued that inequality has impacts on politics, investment, 
etc. which in turn can harm stability and growth in general (e.g., Alesina and Rodrik, 1994); and 
high levels of inequality can even lead to the disintegration of a nation (Bolton and Roland, 
1997). Concerning China’s growing inequality, it has been warned that increased regional 
inequality in China may threaten economic and political stability, and national unity (Hu, Wang 
and Kang, 1995). Is the Chinese duo of high growth and increasing disparity a ‘normal’ 
development path prescribed by the well-known Kuznets curve? Will worsening inequality hurt 
China’s economic growth? To what extent is the widening disparity related to regional 
decentralization?  These are issues still under debate in the literature.  
Although empirical findings unequivocally show rapidly increasing inequality, particularly 
during the recent twenty years of reforms, findings on the relationship between inequality and 
reforms, including decentralization, are divided. Based on a Chinese household survey dataset, 
with about one million households in the period between 1980 and 2002, Ravallion and Chen 
(2007) found that inequality was not always related to growth-enhancing reforms, and that there 
was no overall evidence of an aggregate growth-equity tradeoff in China. They found that higher 
growth in rural areas, which corresponds well with HRS reform and TVE development, brought 
inequality down. It reduced inequality within both urban and rural areas, as well as between 
them. Moreover, provinces with worse disparities, both within rural areas and between urban and 
rural areas, were less able to speed up rural economic growth. However, urban economic growth 
was positively correlated with inequality. Moreover, they found that the increases in public 
spending reduced poverty but not inequality. And, the increases in public spending tended to 
come from sub-national governments, not the central government. Finally, they found substantial 
regional variations such that provinces with a more rapid rise in inequality usually made less 
progress in poverty reduction.  
Based on rural household-level data collected in nine provinces during 1986 to 1999, 
Benjamin, Brandt and Giles (2005) made qualitatively similar conclusions. They found that 
initial inequality affects growth, whereas rising inequality is not related to the growth trajectory. 
Specifically, they found that villages with higher inequality initially - i.e., in 1986 - in their 
sample, grew more slowly over the next thirteen years. However, in village fixed-effects 
specifications, there is no statistical relationship between inequality and growth. They believe 
this suggests that the mechanism linking growth to inequality operates “in the long run.” They 
also found that more unequal villages had the slowest non-agricultural development. Part of the 
explanations for the long-run impacts of inequality on growth may be related to their other 
findings. That is, low inequality is related to the effect of village education, which leads to higher 
income growth, especially of non-farm incomes.  
Yet, worries over ever-increasing inequality are increasing, and the impact of regional 
decentralization on inequality has been hotly debated. Some scholars even argue that the rapid 
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widening of regional disparity caused by regional decentralization can lead to the disintegration 
of China (Hu, Wang and Kang, 1995). Kanbur and Zhang (2005) claim that fiscal 
decentralization is responsible for the rise of nationwide inequality.  
Based on provincial level aggregate data, Kanbur and Zhang (2005) use the GE (the 
generalized entropy index) inequality coefficient, which increased from 0.14 in 1978 to 0.25 in 
2000, and decompose Chinese inequality into three components: inland-coastal and rural-urban. 
They suggest that regional decentralization has contributed to about one-third of Chinese 
inequality. Consistent with some earlier literature (e.g. Tsui, 1993; Chen and Fleisher, 1996; 
Kanbur and Zhang, 2001) they contend that regional disparity in general, and inland-coastal 
disparity in particular, is a key dimension of increased inequality in the reform era. From 1978 to 
2000, the inland-coastal GE component increased by nine times, from 0.4% in 1978 to 3.8% in 
2000. They argue that this rapid widening of the gap between coastal and inland regions is 
mainly due to FDI and trade since the two regions have different opportunities. On the other 
hand, the rural-urban GE coefficient component increased from 11% in 1978 to 13.9% in 2000. 
Although this raise looks marginal, there was an inverse trend, as the number had bottomed out 
at 6.4% in 1984 when the HRS reform was completed.71 They argue that the worsening of the 
rural-urban disparity was also related to FDI and exporting.  
Based on provincial-level data, Lin and Liu (2005) and Fleisher and Chen (1997) also 
claimed that widened regional disparities were related to regional decentralization. Lin and Liu 
(2005) emphasize different sub-national governments’ strategies and their effectiveness in 
economic development, whereas Fleisher and Chen (2005) attribute the widened disparity to the 
central government’s policies of favoring the development of coastal regions, as most important 
reform policies favoring coastal regions are FDI- and export-related policies. Similarly, Yao and 
Zhang (2001), Demurger (2001) and Fu (2004) all claim that these reforms contribute to regional 
inequality. They report that both exports and FDI have significant and positive impacts on 
growth in coastal regions, but not in inland regions.    
Fiscal recentralization was proposed as a policy remedy to ease regional disparities.  
However, based on county-level data, Tsui (2005) and Zhang (2006) find that the regional fiscal 
disparities have worsened since the 1994 fiscal recentralization. Regional disparities in per capita 
fiscal expenditures (and by implication, the provision of services) are extraordinarily large across 
rural governments, and they were persistent since the peak reached in the late 1990s. Among the 
2,800 county-level jurisdictions, in 2003 the richest spent 48 times as much as the poorest – a 
gap that is unusually large compared to that of other countries (Wong, 2007). 
Yet, one has to be careful about real mechanisms behind the so-called fiscal decentralization 
or fiscal centralization as most of the empirical work in the literature is based on aggregate data 
and is carried out in a reduced form. As we discussed previously, at certain times fiscal 
decentralization is concurrent with regional decentralization such that a correlation with fiscal 
decentralization in such a period could capture some things other than fiscal decentralization. On 
the other hand, since the mid-1990s, in addition to fiscal recentralization there have been many 
changes in regional decentralization. Thus, further research should be done to study the impacts 
of regional decentralization and various specific reforms on inequality.     
Based on household data from nine provinces, BBGW found that the contribution of 
regional disparities to household inequality was increasing and peaked in the mid-1990s, when 
fiscal policy was recentralized, and since then it has declined. They find after the mid 1990s, 
most of the inequality in China is within the villages and cities in which Chinese households live 
                                                        
71 Ravallion and Chen (2007) report a similar trend of Rural-urban disparity over this period of time.  
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and work; that is, most of the inequality was due to differences of income among households in 
the same province. 
Concerning the disparity between coastal and interior regions, BBGW found that during the 
1990s the difference in average incomes between the two regions widened considerably. 
However, much of the increase in the gap appears to be the result of a growing difference in 
incomes between rural households in the coastal and interior provinces. By 2000, rural incomes 
in the coastal provinces were about 50% higher than they are in the interior, whereas the urban 
income gap between the two regions did not widen much. Consistently, inequality in the coastal 
provinces increases only slightly (from 0.35 to 0.39), whereas increases are larger in the interior 
(from 0.39 to 0.48). The significantly larger increase in the interior is attributed to the increase in 
inequality in rural areas in the interior (increases from 0.40 to 0.49) compared to the coastal 
provinces, which remains under 0.40; and a widening rural-urban income gap in the interior 
(which widened from 1.58 to 1.85) compared to the coastal areas (which fell from 1.60 to 1.32).  
BBGW’s findings suggest a strong link between inequality and regional decentralization, but 
due to a different mechanism than many other proposed. Instead of regional disparity, they argue 
that economic opportunity for citizens varies across regions, and this affects the development of 
rural areas. Thus, local institutions and differences in the opportunities for people living in the 
same community explain most of the rising inequalities. Concretely, they contend that at the 
outset of the reforms, the role of the state sector was significantly more important in the interior 
than in the coastal provinces. During the reform, the growth of the non-state sector in the interior 
provinces has been much slower. This has handicapped the growth in rural incomes in both the 
urban and rural sectors. In contrast, growth in the non-state sector in coastal provinces has 
provided opportunities to rural households, which has prevented a sharp deterioration in rural 
inequality like that observed in the interior.  
 
6.4 Resolving China’s Institutional Problems  
The lack of an independent judiciary, rent-seeking behaviour, and unresponsiveness to 
citizens’ preferences etc. are some of the intrinsic deficiencies of an authoritarian regime, and 
China’s RDA regime is no exception. As discussed previously, some of those problems might be 
mitigated under the RDA regime when economic growth is an overwhelming objective, because 
the multiple tasks of a regional government can be effectively converted into a single task, 
achieving a high GDP growth rate. Under this condition, regional competition can alleviate many 
problems.  
However, when there are many tasks which are not well-defined by quantitative targets, 
regional competition may lead to problems, such as regional protection and ignoring tasks that 
are not directly growth-enhancing, etc. It has been widely reported that there has been a severe 
deterioration of China’s environment as a result of its rapid economic growth. SO2 emissions 
increased from 19.9 million tons in 2000 to 25.5 million tons in 2005 making China the largest 
emitter of SO2 (World Bank, 2007). Moreover, this deterioration was closely related with a lack 
of interest from sub-national government officials, who found that enforcing environmental 
regulations detracted from their ability to provide regional economic growth (Li, 2006).  
Theoretically, if all tasks and their outcomes could be well measured, then by assigning a 
policy weight for each task it might be possible to construct a comprehensive index to 
summarize an official’s achievement of all tasks. In this way, a multi-task problem could be 
reduced into a single-task problem, and regional competition and experimentation over the 
comprehensive index would function well. The “Green GDP” proposal of the Chinese 
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government is an endeavour in this direction (Economy, 2007). However, most provincial 
governments who initially joined this ‘Green GDP’ project have withdrawn from it due to a 
conflict of interests (between growth and other objectives) and disagreements on technical issues 
related to its measurement. Indeed, this idea is fundamentally flawed and the problem can be 
traced back to the Lange vs. Hayek debate on the feasibility/infeasibility of centralized 
information collection. The GDP measurement is market-based, and therefore market 
transactions have already solved a large share of the associated incentive and information 
problems. The difficulties in measuring non-market activities, i.e. beyond GDP measurement, are 
notoriously difficult due to incentive and technical problems. If there existed a general way to 
measure economic activities without using markets, or to measure non-market activities 
accurately and efficiently, a centralized economy would be able to resolve all incentive and 
information problems at least as well as a market economy.  
It is known that assigning high-powered incentives, through methods such as tournament 
competition, to sub-national officials can be harmful when they are responsible for multiple tasks 
(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). However, without regional competition, sub-national officials 
under the RDA regime would not make efforts to initiate reforms or undertake growth-enhancing 
activities, which would deeply affect China’s future development. In the following I briefly 
discuss some principles to handle this dilemma. 
First, the multi-task problem can be mitigated by redefining tasks assigned to ministries and 
provincial governments. The scope of tasks to be carried out by sub-national governments should 
be narrowed down. For example, responsibilities for activities with strong cross-region 
externalities should be centralized and regulated by ministries. Moreover, to reduce the multi-
task problem at the central level, tasks to be handled by the central government should be 
handled by specialized ministries, special courts, and specialized regulatory bodies. Second, 
many monitoring and law enforcement functions, including regulation, should be separated from 
sub-national governments, i.e. should be carried out by an independent press and an independent 
judiciary. This will not only reduce the multi-task problem of sub-national governments 
effectively, but also greatly enhance neutrality, objectiveness, justice and thus effectiveness in 
monitoring and law enforcement. Third - and this would further entrench reforms - most market 
activities should be carried out by firms and should be separated from sub-national governments. 
This will not only narrow the tasks of sub-national governments, but it would also preserve 
strong incentives for firms for economic development even when incentives of sub-national 
governments are weakened.  
I must make it clear that some of the most serious and fundamental problems intrinsic to the 
RDA regime cannot possibly be resolved without a fundamental institutional change. The multi-
task problem faced by sub-national governments is fundamentally associated with the fact that 
officials are accountable to their bosses, who face inherent and difficult informational problems 
in performance evaluation, not to mention the legitimacy problems of the central leadership 
(Section 2). The ultimate solution to those problems lies in transforming the RDA regime into a 
democratic federal system in which sub-national officials are elected and are accountable to their 
constituencies, so that their multi-task problem will be converted into a single-task election 
problem. Arguably, to some extent this transformation is on its way, but very slowly, in a 
bottom-up fashion. In the past decade, most village heads (O’Brien and Li, 2000; 2006) and some 
township heads (Li, 2002) in China were elected; and systematic evidence shows that elected 
officials provide better public services and are more harmonious with their constituencies than 
appointed ones (Brandt and Turner, 2006; Rozelle et al., 2009). If China is unable to meet the 
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serious challenges of managing the institutional transformation into a democratic federal system, 
China’s political stability and long run development could be put in jeopardy.  
Another closely related, fundamental, and challenging problem China has faced is law and 
law enforcement. To some extent, by deploying a regulatory decentralization regime as a 
substitute, China has mitigated or postponed serious problems associated with the absence of the 
rule of law, and has therefore won itself some time to reform its law and legal institutions. 
However, arguably, reform in this area is among the slowest and weakest, and this slow pace has 
caused and will continue to cause severe socio-economic problems. As the private sector and 
markets become fundamentally important to the economy, the negative impacts of bad laws and 
the absence of the rule of law will become even more manifest. The lack of an independent 
judiciary is one of the most serious problems; additionally, this is an intrinsic problem of the 
RDA regime, and therefore an ultimate resolution depends on institutional transformation. 
Following successful experiences in previous reforms, China should start to establish an 
independent judiciary system at the county level - the bottom sub-national level - and expand the 
reform upwards. Without substantial legal reforms, the absence of the rule of law could lead 
entrenched interest groups, particularly corrupt officials, to block the reform, obstruct 
development, and even threaten the political stability of the nation.  
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper I argue that the regional competition and experimentation governed by China’s 
regionally decentralized authoritarian (RDA) regime have effectively alleviated potential 
incentive and informational problems. By linking regional performance to officials’ promotion, 
tournament-like regional competition provides high-powered incentives to sub-national officials 
to initiate and to implement market-oriented reforms, while simultaneously limiting corruption72 
(Section 3). Therefore, to some extent, competition among sub-national governments encouraged 
or forced them to create implicitly the institutions essential for a well-functioning market 
(Section 5). Furthermore, by incorporating regional experimentation into the central 
government’s decision-making process, reforms are less likely to be blocked, and the political 
and technical risks of reforms are greatly reduced (Section 4).  
Nevertheless, the very same institution, the RDA regime, and the solutions created and 
implemented by the RDA regime - as highly imperfect substitutes for “standard” solutions - also 
have created serious problems (Section 6). Yet, given the political and economic context of 
China’s reforms (Section 2), many “standard” approaches were and are politically and 
institutionally infeasible, and it could be even worse for China’s reforms if a reform fails as a 
result of implementing an infeasible approach. In this sense, the regional competition and 
regional experiments implemented by the RDA regime are second-best solutions.   
To highlight the major features of the RDA regime, the following Table 6 compares the 
characteristics of China’s RDA regime with the federal state and the Soviet system.  
As it evolved from a unique history, China’s RDA regime is itself somewhat unique. 
Therefore, many reform policies that fit with this regime could not be easily transplanted as a 
package to other countries. However, there are still some general lessons that can be drawn from 
China’s reforms and development for other developing countries.  
The first general lesson is our understanding of “institutions” and their relationship with 
                                                        
72 My prediction is if there was no fierce regional competition, corruption would collapse Chinese government and 
Chinese economy.   
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development. During its process of transition and development, China has changed its 
institutions at a large scale and has created market-supporting institutions in an evolutionary way, 
i.e. new institutions have gradually replaced old institutions when the new is ready. It would be 
mistaken to advise transition economies or developing countries to abandon their existing 
institutions in a rush by copying stylized “best practice” or “good” institutions without a careful 
understanding of the operation of both inherited and new institutions. As a matter of fact, the 
sophisticated market-supporting institutions observed in today’s developed world were not 
created overnight73; instead, they historically co-evolved with markets. Thus, for a country with 
many missing “good institutions”, like China, it is inevitable to use existing institutions, such as 
the government, as a starting point to pave the road for institutional evolution.   
 
Table 6. Characteristics of China’s RDA Regime Compared with Other Regimes 
 China’s RDA Regime Soviet System Federal State 
Composition of  
national decision-
making body 
Central, regional and 
ministerial officials  










experiments as a strategy 
Top-down; SOE-
Ministry bargaining  














To be elected; 
Independent from the 
federal government; 
Accountable to local 
constituencies 








Regional experiment Local experiments as 
part of central decision-
making; Experimental 
results may become 
national policy   
Not important States are “laboratories” 
for policy; Voluntary 




Overly simplistic, black-and-white views of government are detrimental to reforms and 
economic development. There is a popular view that reforms in transition and developing 
economies should focus on confining the government, such that the role of the government 
should be restricted to the protection of property rights and contract enforcement. However, it 
has been well argued that reform and economic development involves complementary 
institutional changes to be carried out by the government. China’s reforms in particular, and the 
experience of East Asian development in general (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong 
Kong) illustrate this (Lin, 2007); the history of market development in pre-industrial revolution 
Britain also illustrate this (Smith, 1763). The government is the most important institution in any 
country (Stiglitz, 1989) and its involvement is essential for market development (Smith, 1776), 
                                                        
73 Ironically, the on-going catastrophic financial crisis makes it crystal clear how problematic the legal (regulatory) 
and financial institutions are in the most advanced market economies. If we economists had a standard universal 
recipe on the shelf for institutional building, as offered to transition and developing economies, why do not we apply 
the recipe to fix these problems in advanced market economies?  
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and this has borne out yet again during the market reforms in China. In addition to macro and 
political stability, national reform strategies, a functioning national government also determines 
effectiveness of decentralization, which is the next point I want to make.   
The second general lesson is to use regional decentralization as an approach to solve 
incentive problems imbedded in reforms. China’s reforms illustrate that the ability to reform 
institutions is endogenized as a result of the incentives of the stakeholders of existing institutions; 
while existing institutions are endogenized as a result of a country’s history, social norms, culture, 
endowment and technology, etc. These facts make institutional reform and policy design 
fundamentally different from engineering design. The primary reason why many reforms with 
comprehensive plans failed was a lack of understanding of details of existing institutions, and of 
stakeholders’ incentive problems with newly designed institutions, particularly when those were 
designed by outside “experts”, who are not informed on those incentive problems. A thorough 
understanding of the details of existing institution in general, and the incentive problems of the 
stakeholders of a reform program in particular, is the foremost factor in determining the fate of a 
given reform.  
Although at an abstract level there may exist commonly agreed-on goals for reforms or 
economic development, it is often not very helpful to prescribe a universal policy recipe in detail. 
This is because any effective policy recipe must take into account the interests of stakeholders in 
the existing institution, which varies from country to country and from context to context. When 
China ‘ignored’ standard advice, what they ignored was mainly the details, particularly when 
these were not incentive-compatible with Chinese stakeholders, and thus would not work. 
Sometimes they have also ‘ignored’ basic principles of standard advice due to political 
considerations, which is another type of incentive compatibility problem. Most of the details of 
Chinese reform policies were not designed ex ante, but instead evolved during the process of the 
reforms when incentive problems were resolved.  
The importance of decentralization is not only due to heterogeneous local preferences, (Oates, 
1999) but also due to heterogeneous local incentive problems and local institutional 
arrangements which can be handled more properly locally. Economic reforms and economic 
development are path-dependent, and this is true not only at the national level, but also at the 
sub-national level. A local history determines what interests stakeholders have nested into the 
existing institution there and how those affect institutional reforms in the locality. The typical 
approaches deployed in Chinese reforms evolved as a result of dealing with local incentive-
compatible problems explicitly.74 Regional competition and regional experiment facilitate this 
approach, thus making reform easier. A large number of reforms in China were locally-initiated 
responses to local problems. The greatest benefit of this decentralized approach is that it evolves 
within the existing institutional framework. Therefore, it is easier for a reform to be incentive-
compatible, the reform will fit better with local conditions, and when new problems arise, 
officials will have better incentives and information to find solutions.  
However, what is the limitation of decentralization? Or what is the boundary of a national 
government? Pushing decentralization to the limit, if every city is completely decentralized and 
becomes an independent country, each city-state will have substantial powers and responsibilities 
and each will subject a hard budget constraint, should this be optimal? Applying the analytical 
framework of this paper (Sections 2, 3 and 4), I would argue that in addition to social costs of 
breaking up of a nation (depending on the procedure these costs may vary from extremely high, 
                                                        
74 The Pareto-improving requirement (a la Lau, Qian and Roland, 2000) is the strongest criterion, whereas the 
incentive-compatible requirement is weaker and more general. 
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e.g. anarchy or a civil war, to almost zero, e.g. a peaceful referendum and an orderly change), 
there are “pure” economic reasons that under certain conditions an integrated nation with 
regional decentralization can dominate a nation’s breaking up. This is because the central 
government in an integrated nation is in a good position to address externalities among regions, 
such as strong positive externalities created by a few local experiments in a nation.  
The last, but not the least, general lesson from China’s reform is the importance of sub-
national governments. Decentralization is important for reforms and economic development in 
all countries, except city-states. To make decentralization work, sub-national governments should 
not only be empowered, but also enabled. The literature on decentralization and federalism 
emphasizes empowering sub-national governments, but hardly discusses enabling sub-national 
governments. Enablement does not come automatically with empowerment. Without enablement, 
sub-national governments would not be able to take policy actions, and decentralization would 
not work even when they are legally empowered. Moreover, enablement is a necessary condition 
for commitment to, and institutionalization of, decentralization. This point illustrates again that 
the overly simplistic view of confining government’s resources and functions without a careful 
study of the context can be harmful to policy. Indeed, in many decentralized developing 
economies, sub-national governments are not enabled. For example, under-funding of required 
expenditures on local infrastructure or social services has been common in most decentralized 
developing countries (Bardhan, 2002; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006). In contrast, all major 
reforms were initiated and carried out by Chinese sub-national governments since they not only 
had the incentives to do so, but also they have the resources to proceed even if a given reform 
was not fully endorsed, i.e. not completely empowered.75 This may explain partly why “China is 
the only country [in the world] where the local governments have played a leading role in 
increasing rates of growth” (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006). A country’s history determines to 
what extent sub-national governments are enabled, and which government is enabled. This 
implies that except for general principles, standard policy-recipes may not work uniformly even 
within a country. This is another reason to support decentralization. 
                                                        
75 Many Chinese local governments in less-developed-regions also suffered severe under-funding problems for local 
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